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CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES:
REESTABLISHING THE BALANCE
WITHIN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Mary Christine Hutton*
Child advocates-social workers, psychologists, physicians, attorneys-have played a powerful role in drawing the focus of
American society to the vulnerable situation of children in our
culture. From notices on milk cartons and in newspapers to
scholarly discussions in professional journals, advocates address
the unique problems of children. The public may not consciously
distinguish among the types of violence towards children, 1 but it
is more aware of adult mistreatment of children than ever
before. Particularly in the area of child sexual abuse, 2 advocates
have achieved remarkable success in destroying many of the
myths surrounding children's experience and veracity and in educating the public about their situation. 3
• Associate Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law. A.B., 1973,
St. Joseph's University; J.D., 1978, Washburn University; LL.M., 1984, Harvard University Law School. The author wishes to thank Gerald Kaufman for his research assistance.
1. Even with increased awareness, however, the public may not distinguish different
types of violence toward children. See R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE (1978); CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE (R. Bourne & E. Newberger eds. 1979); Pfohl, The
"Discovery" of Child Abuse, 24 Soc. PROBS. 310 (1976-1977); see also THE HISTORY OF
CHILDHOOD (L. deMause ed. 1974) (survey of the abuse of children throughout history).
2. Simply defined, child sexual abuse is "a sexual act imposed on a child who lacks
emotional, maturational, and cognitive development." Sgroi, Blick & Porter, A Conceptual Framework for Child Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABusE 9 (S. Sgroi ed. 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; see also D.
FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 2-16 (1979); SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS (A. Burgess, A. Groth, L. Holmstrom & S. Sgroi eds. 1978); Finkelhor,
Common Features of Family Abuse, in THE DARK SmE OF FAMILIES 17 (D. Finkelhor, R.
Gelles, G. Hotaling & M. Straus eds. 1983); Tierney & Corwin, Exploring Intrafamilial
Child Sexual Abuse: A Systems Approach, in THE DARK SmE OF FAMILIES, supra, at 102.
The extent of child sexual abuse is unknown, although estimates have been made.
Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of lntrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse
of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABusE & NEGLECT 133 (1983) (random sample of 930
women in San Francisco revealing that 38% had experienced abuse before age 18).
3. See D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 87-106 (1984). Finkelhor notes that a survey of Boston parents in 1981 revealed that many of the past myths and misconceptions
about child sexual abuse no longer exist. Approximately 93% of the respondents had
been exposed to a discussion of child sexual abuse within the last year. Many respondents still maintained the belief, however, that the child bore some responsibility for the
sexual contact if he or she did not object strenuously. See also Berliner, The Child Wit·
ness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 167, 178-79 (1985).
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In addition to their efforts to eliminate inappropriate and unfounded attitudes towards children through public awareness
and education, child advocates have lobbied for legislation to assist children, particularly in the criminal justice system. To accomplish their lobbying objectives, the advocates have exposed
some of the system's past failures in dealing with children as
victims and witnesses.• Child advocates have also provided the
impetus behind amendments to the rules of evidence, 5 videotaping of children's statements,6 proposals to remove the child from
courtroom proceedings, 7 and the use of supportive courtroom
techniques for the child. 8 Perhaps more importantly, psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals who have studied
the problem have added a dimension of expertise, and have provided valuable insight into the extent of child sexual abuse and
the symptoms of abused children. 9
4. See, e.g., Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969); Parker, The Rights of Child
Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982);
The Child Witness, J. Soc. lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 1-175.
5. The most common amendments create an exception to the hearsay rule for child
victims of sexual abuse. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp. 1986); CoLO. REv. STAT.
§ 18-3-411(3) (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 11 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (Supp. 1986); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS§ 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5-411 (Supp. 1986); VT. R. Evm.
804a (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251 to -4253 (Supp.
1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2037 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West
Supp. 1987); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (1985); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15:283, :440.1-:440.6 (West Supp. 1987J; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205
(Supp. 1986) ("recorded by any means approved by the court"); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 4615-401 to -403 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 753 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 967.04(1)-(3), 967.04(7) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986).
Several authorities have expressed discomfort with enhancement of credibility through
"status-conferral" by using closed circuit TV or videotaping. See Hochheiser v. Superior
Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777,786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278-79 (1984), discussed in Graham,

lndicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 67-76 (1985).
7. Parker, supra note 4, at 653; Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without
Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131 (1981).
8. E.g., Whitcomb, Assisting Child Victims in the Courts: The Practical Side of Legislative Reform, in PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 13 (National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy &
Protection 1985) [hereinafter PAPERS FROM NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE) (recommending techniques that do not rely on advanced technology, such as the use of dolls
and child-sized chairs in the courtroom, and demystification of the courtroom prior to
trial); see also J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1981).
9. See infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text. Experts in the field of child sexual
abuse are developing a wealth of literature. Among the most useful are D. FINKELHOR,
supra note 3; HANDBOOK, supra note 2; and THE DARK SmE OF FAMILIES, supra note 2.
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Operating the criminal justice system with more sensitivity toward children and with a greater role for child advocates has
resulted in major departures from the traditional adversarial
methods of trial. In the past, cases involving child victims proceeded along the same lines as other criminal trials, with indepth and vigorous cross-examination of the victim, 10 skepticism
toward the child's account, and little psychiatric or psychological
expertise in the field to support the child's claim. 11 Now that
child advocates have modified the adversary process to accommodate child victims, the impact of those modifications on the
goals of the adversary system should be examined.
This Article begins with an overview of the adversary process
and how it has changed in recent years to respond to the needs
of children. The Article highlights two of the goals of the adversary process-(!) testing and probing of two sides to a story, and
(2) refraining from a decision until the complete story is
told-to examine how they can be retained in spite of these
changes. Part II pinpoints the assignment of multiple or poorlydefined roles to the child sexual abuse professionals 12 as one of
the potential impediments to preserving the goals of the adversarial system. The performance of multiple roles occurs when
the legal system asks these professionals to perform four functions: to evaluate whether the alleged acts have occurred, to
chronicle the child's account of events, to serve as an expert witness on the problem of child sexual abuse, and to act as an advocate· and supporter for the child. The assignment of a poorlydefined role occurs when the intervenor is asked to perform one
function, such as therapy, and the legal system misuses the results. Although these problems with assigned functions are not
The classic study in the field is V. DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX
CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS (1969).
10. See F. BAILEY & H. RoTHBLATT, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: RAPE AND OTHER SEX
CRIMES § 333 (1973) (recommending that cross-examination of the child should not be
brutal, so as to arouse sympathy, but should be designed-to lead the child into traps).
11. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924(a) (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970 & Supp. 1987) (suggesting that a young girl or woman complainant who charges
a sexual crime should have a psychiatric examination because of the proclivity of contriving false charges against men: "[t)heir psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted
partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly
by bad social environment, [and] partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions"); M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 374 (1952); Goodman,
Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1984, at 9.
12. This generic term includes protective service workers, child psychologists, and
other professionals who are asked to intervene to assist children alleged to have been
abused sexually. The terms "intervenor" and "child sexual abuse professional" are used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
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present in every case, they arise frequently enough to warrant
scrutiny of their effect on the adversary nature of criminal proceedings and on the checks built into the system. Finally, Part
III concludes that if multiple functions have been assigned to an
intervenor or if the potential for misuse of the intervenor's work
exists, the court should limit the scope of the intervenor's testimony to avoid its misapplication or should appoint an independent expert to evaluate and critique the intervenor's work.

I.

THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

An adversarial process 13 and the availability of trial by jury
characterize the American system of adjudication in criminal
cases. The adversarial model anticipates each litigant will have a
theory of the case and will present evidence and witnesses who
support that position to a neutral fact finder. 14 The latter will
hear the testimony, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and
decide which party will prevail. The underlying theory is that
the interested parties, motivated by the desire to win, will marshal the forces needed to convince the fact finder. lli In the process, it is hoped, truth will be determined and justice achieved. 16
13. The development of the adversary system is traced in 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956); G. KEETON, THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE COMMON LAW (1966). The modern adversary process is discussed in J. FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL 80-125 (1949) and C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 116-40 (1980); see also
Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of-Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 115, 126-31 (1985) (discussing existing trial procedure as effective means of
avoiding conviction of the innocent and warning that drastic modifications in child sexual abuse cases would alter the balance in favor of conviction).
14. C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 275; Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON
AMERICAN LAW 34-47 (H. Berman ed. 1971).
15. C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 321. But see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975) (criticizing the adversarial "winning" approach); contra Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1060 (1975) (arguing that the "winning" approach of the adversary system works well
not only in establishing truth but also in protecting basic rights).
16. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (applying a theory of the
adversary system in which parties contest all issues before a court of law, the need to
develop all facts is fundamental, and to ensure justice, the process must be available for
the production of evidence for both sides). Whether the system actually functions according to the theory behind it is a matter of debate. L. FoRER, THE DEATH OF THE LAW
131-54 (1975) (critiquing the adversary process); J. FRANK, supra note 13, at 80-102 (noting that "fighting" theory of the adversary system, when excessive, disserves the "truth" seeking process); Frankel, supra note 15; Freedman, supra note 15.
Some have argued that the adoption of a neutral posture by the fact finder results in
an emphasis on dispute resolution between the parties rather than a search for truth.
This argument is addressed in S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3 (1984).

WINTER

1987)

Balancing the Child Abuse System

495

The adversarial process is characterized in large part by the
division of functions performed by the participants. 17 The fact
finder, either judge or jury, is a pa,ssive participant in the case,
relying on the evidence as it is presented by the parties and controlled by the rules governing its admissibility and use at trial. 18
In addition, the fact finder must be neutral; decisions in the case
should be objective and free from bias. 19
The function of the fact finder sharply contrasts with that of
the advocate. Each litigant in the case is entitled to have a representative who will present that party's theory as forcefully and
persuasively as possible. The advocate embraces the client's position and does what is needed, within ethical constraints, to
win. 20
The tools of the advocate vary depending on the case. One of
the most powerful in a criminal trial is the accused's right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him or her. 21
The use of leading questions in cross-examination exposes to the
fact finder the witness's faulty perception, fading memory, bias,
motive, and lack of opportunity to observe. 22 One witness's perceptions may differ radically from another's-each believing his
account is the truth. 23 Cross-examination points out the discrepancies and gives the fact finder the opportunity to evaluate
which vers10n more closely approximates reality. At the same
17. Fuller, supra note 14, at 30.
18. C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 321.
19. Fuller, supra note 14, at 30. The following is typical of instructions to the jury on
its duty in reaching a verdict:
Consider this case carefully and honestly with due regard for the interests of
society and the rights of the defendant. You should decide the case fairly and
impartially without fear or favor upon the evidence produced and the instructions of the court. It must not be decided from any feeling of bias or prejudice
against or sympathy for the defendant. Your duty upon such fair consideration
of the case is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged in the information.
South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions 1-23 (1970).
20. J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY §§ 1.2-.10 (1975); J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS 5-6
(1983). But see Frankel, supra note 15, at 1036; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 30 (critiquing lawyers' rationalizations of the profession's failure to be
bound by personal and social norms imposed on the rest of society).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
22. 3A J. WmMORE, supra note 11, §§ 948-956, 993-995; C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at
337; Markus, A Theory of Trial Advocacy, 56 TULANE L. REV. 95, 97-101, 106-11 (1981).
23. J. FRANK, supra note 13, at 17-21; J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT
8-44 (1980); F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION 27 (4th ed. 1936); Goodman &
Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
181, 184 (1985); Markus, supra note 22, at 97-101.
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time, leading questions enable the advocate to suggest his or her
client's theory of the case to the fact finder. 24
The third important participant in the adversary process is
the witness. In theory, witnesses are called not to advocate one
side or the other, but to tell the truth as they know it. 26 Although a party may call a witness who is hostile to his or her
case, for the most part; a party will call witnesses who help to
establish his or her point of view. 26
The functions and types of witnesses have undergone dramatic changes over time with the refinement of the adversary
system. 27 In general, witnesses now can be categorized as follows:
(1) occurrence witnesses (those who have observed an event in
the case or one relevant to the case), 28 (2) expert witnesses
(those who have knowledge that will help jurors to understand
relevant evidence), 29 (3) reputation and opinion witnesses (those
who offer reputation or opinion evidence on character or credibility),30 and (4) hearsay witnesses (those who give accounts not·
based on firsthand knowledge). 31 In a typical case, it is unlikely
that a single witness will fall into .multiple categories, but this
possibility exists, and nothing in the system prevents it from
occurring.
24. J. McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 107 (1961); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 240-41 (1980).
25. A typical oath or affirmance for a witness requires that the person tell "the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth." E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-3.1 {1979);
see also Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171, 1173 {5th Cir. 1981) {stating that
witnesses do not belong to parties, and the jury is entitled to hear all relevant evidence,
so any attempt to exclude such evidence by settlement agreement is improper).
26. This is in contrast to the operation of the continental systems. See generally
Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083,
1088, 1090-95 {1975) (noting that all witnesses are evidentiary sources for the bench and
there are no separate witnesses for prosecution and defense).
27. In the early days of the common law, "compurgators" {"oath-helpers") were
called, not to give substantive evidence, but to swear the defendant was truthful in denying his guilt of the offense. Compurgators eventually were replaced by witnesses who
could testify about the facts at issue in the case, based upon hearsay and, later, upon
personal knowledge. See generally C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 100-01, 144-52. In some
jurisdictions, the defendant was excluded as a witness because he was deemed incompetent to testify under oath, yet was permitted to make an unsworn statement. E.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 {1961).
28. T. MAUET, supra note 24, at 98-99.
29. FED. R. Evm. 702. See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Ev1DENCE 11 702(01] (1985 & Supp. 1987).
30. FED. R. Evm. 404, 405, 608, 609. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 29, 1111 404(01)-405(03]; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 1111 608(03]-[04],
608[08]; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 100, 550 {E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
31. FED. R. Evm. 801-806. See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29,
1111 801(01)-806(02).
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Traditionally, occurrence witnesses have been the mainstay of
criminal cases. 32 The prosecutor calls the victim and whomever
else observed the alleged acts to describe what happened, and,
on cross-examination, the defense probes and challenges the witnesses' accounts. The legal system disfavors hearsay accounts of
the alleged acts because of the bias against rumor and unfounded assertions as the basis for a criminal conviction. 33 Despite the general disfavor in which hearsay testimony is held,
however, numerous exceptions have dev~loped over the years because, in theory, the testimony in · question is reliable and
trustworthy. 34
Why has the adversary system continued in this basic form
with these settled role assignments? Tradition, habit, and fear of
change offer a partial explanation. 311 Proponents of the system,
however, offer two more fundamental rationales. First, they argue that truth is elusive 36 and can best be determined by exploring multiple versions of events as exposed by the advocate's posing of difficult and probing questions. 37 Second, the proponents
claim that such a presentation is the most effective way of precluding judgments made too swiftly, in reliance on what is familiar to the fact finder. 38 Forcing the decision maker to delay passing judgment on the case until both sides have presented their
evidence precludes reaching conclusions based on the fact
finder's own biases and preconceptions. The presentations of
counsel should comprise a full and zealous version of events,
which will enable the fact finder to view the case through the
eyes of each litigant and piece together the fragments presented
by the witnesses into an overall picture of what occurred. 39
32. T. MAUET, supra note 24, at 98-99.
33. This is also the genesis of the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI; 5 J. W1GMORE, supra note 11, § 1364.
34. FED. R. Evm. 803, 804.
35. Frankel, supra note 15, at 1052-55.
36. J. TANFORD, supra note 20, at 5.
37. Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1067-68, 1076-77 (1975) (stating that the juxtaposition of two contrary perspectives and the impact of challenge and counterproof often
disclose to neutral intelligence the most likely structure of truth; also noting the difference between legal truth and factual truth). But see Damaska, supra note 26, at 1090-95;
Frankel, supra note 15, at 1038-39.
38. See Fuller, supra note 14, at 39-40.
39. Id.; see also Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 29-31 (arguing that the adversary process
should be employed in adjudications of delinquency to maintain the testing of both sides
and to avoid jumping to conclusions).

498

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:2

In response to a deeply-rooted dissatisfaction with the workings of the adversary process in cases with child victims,4° certain changes have been made to accommodate children. The reforms are particularly relevant in cases of child sexual abuse,
because the traditional form of adjudication has changed radically. In the past, the fact finder relied primarily on the testimony of the child.• 1 This testimony was corroborated by any
physical evidence and by the credibility of the child42 and reinforced by the fact finder's own view of the likelihood that child
sexual abuse occurred. 43 Revisions to hearsay rules in some jurisdictions have eliminated the testimony of the child as a necessary part of the government's case. 44 As a result, someone to
whom the child has related the story may substitute for the
child in court and explain the child's version of events. That
person is called as a proxy for the child, or as a supplemental
witness to reaffirm the child's testimony. This new approach is a
response to the perception that the process of cross-examination
confuses and traumatizes children and that the benefits of such
40. See Parker, supra note 4.
41. This, of course, assumes that the child was found competent to testify. See Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1981).
42. See Goodman, Golding & Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, J. Soc.
lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 139 (reviewing factors that influence jurors' perceptions of the
credibility of child witnesses); see also Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child
Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 201 (1980) (study of the reliability of
children as witnesses); Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, J. Soc.
lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 51 (regarding the suggestibility of children).
43. In some cases, juries convicted on the word of the child, but legal rules required
reversal of the conviction. See, e.g., State v. Quinnild, 231 Minn. 99, 42 N.W.2d 409
(1950) (holding that the statements of a 13-year-old boy two hours after sexual assault
are not properly admitted as res gestae; conviction reversed; no expert testimony); State
v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 565, 16 S.E. 803 (1893) (reversing conviction for carnal knowledge
of a five-year-old girl; child's testimony was "prattle"); Rex v. Coyle, N. Ir. 208 (C.A.
1926) (holding that the unsworn testimony of a young child was not corroborated by the
unsworn testimony of other children or by her statements to her mother). But see State
v. Fisher, 222 Kan. 76, 563 P.2d 1012 (1977) (convicting defendant in a case where the·
only evidence was that an 11-year-old girl reported incidents of sexual abuse to her
mother, who took her to the police where she repeated her account; child testified consistently at preliminary hearing; at trial, child recanted and said she had lied; defendant
denied the allegations); State v. Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 40 N.W.2d 347 (1949) (affirming
conviction for indecent assault on four-year-old boy; statements to mother describing
event admissible as res gestae; no expert testimony).
Expert testimony seems not to have been widely used in cases of child sexual abuse
before the late 1970's when research in the area developed to a sophisticated level. State
v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982), was among the first to employ such testimony. See Goodman, supra note 11, at 18-24 (describing psychological research on children in the twentieth century).
44. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 19-16-38 (1987); WASH. REV. CoDE § 9A.44.120 (Supp.
1987); see supra note 5.
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questioning do not outweigh the costs of harming the child or
obscuring the truth. 411
In the process of "piecing together" the case, the fact finder
may not be given the opportunity to view the child and hear his
or· her account firsthand, but instead, may have to rely on secondary sources such as the child's proxy. In addition, the fact
finder may have to rely on the explanations of expert witnesses
about child sexual abuse. Although the use of expert witnesses
in adversary proceedings is far from new, their use in sexual
abuse cases for the government is a relatively recent development. 46 In many courts, they are given wide latitude to explain
sexual abuse and how children react to it. 47 Government counsel
seeks their explanations particularly when the defense alleges
fabrication or fantasy by the child. In effect, they are given the
opportunity to explain the facts of the case in a coherent manner to the fact finder.
How does the adversary proce$s work once these reforms have
been made? The functions of the fact finder and advocate remain the same, but the information presented to the jury or
judge differs in content and form, and the presentation is accomplished with different types of witnesses. The expert witness
and hearsay witness may replace or supplement the occurrence
witness-the child-as the primary source of information for the
fact finder. The need to judge the credibility and reliability of
the occurrence witness's account at trial lessens because substitutes for that evidence have been adopted. Credibility need not
be evaluated solely through the occurrence witness's demeanor;
the emphasis is on the fact finder's assessment of the hearsay
45. E.g., State v. McNeely, 314 N.C. 451, 454-57, 333 S.E.2d 738, 740-42 (1985) (providing an example of cross-examination of a child that convinced the court she was not
qualified to be a witness); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 416, 484 A.2d 1330,
1332 (1984) (psychiatrist testifying that a 10-year-old child's testimony should be
presented by videotape because it would improve its accuracy, and providing his opinion
that children and adults react in opposite ways to the courtroom's trappings and formalities-adults are more likely to be truthful and children are less likely because they are
fearful, guilty, anxious, and traumatized). See generally Goodman & Helgeson, Child
Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 201 (1985);
Pierron, K.S.A. 60-460(dd): The New Kansas Law Regarding Admissibility of ChildVictim Hearsay Statements, 52 J. KAN. B.A. 88, 89 (1983) ("A gap between what is reliable and what is admissible has developed. Children may often be able to tell who brutalized them with great believability and truthfulness. However, the information is not always admissible if the child is not qualified as a witness."); Skoler, New Hearsay
Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 37, 47
(1984); Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse
Cases, 83 CoLuM. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1983).
46. See supra note 43; infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
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witness's account of events, bolstered by the expert witness's
description of the general nature and pattern of child sexual
abuse. 48
The change in witnesses necessarily has modified the tools of
the advocate. Cross-examination of the victim-witness to test
perception, bias, and motive may not be available in the case. 49
Although the hearsay witness and expert can be cross-examined,
the focus of the cross-examination is different: the inquiry is not
directed at an occurrence witness's observation of events, but at
the hearsay witness's or expert witness's interpretation of what
the child has told them. The advocate tests and probes these
witnesses' accounts of and conclusions about what happened,
rather than the facts that comprise the incident, as is done with
an occurrence witness. Thus, a buffer has been placed between
the victim-witness and the fact finder.
Modification of the adversary system to accommodate children has been hailed as an important means of ensuring the vindication of children's right to be free from abuse.Go How these
changes work in practice must be examined closely to be certain
that the goals of the adversary system-scrutiny of evidence and
impartiality before the time of judgment-have been preserved.
The fact finder may be less able and less likely to act in accordance· with the goals of the adversary process as a result of the
reforms. Eliminating the ability to probe a firsthand account results in the presentation of a sanitized version of those observations to the fact finder. Often, the system has asked the person
who gives that presentation to decide whether sexual abuse occurred. Gl The fact finder may take the witness's affirmative re48. E.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984).
49. The child's statement describing an act of sexual contact or rape is admissible if
certain conditions are met. See supra note 5; infra note 111. If the child is unavailable as
a witness, his or her statement is admissible if there is corroboration of the act. See State
v. Spronk, 379 N.W.2d 312, 313-14 (S.D. 1985).
50. Skoler, supra note 45, at 38-46 (arguing that new hearsay exceptions for child
victims of sex crimes are needed because the out-of-court statement of a child may be
more reliable than an in-court statement). But see Schultz, The Child Sex Victim: Social, Psychological and Legal Perspectives, 52 CHILD WELFARE 147, 150 (1973) (stating
that the trauma to a child is caused not only by society's use of the victim to prosecute
the offender, but also by parents' reactions; i.e., parents may need to prove to themselves
and to society that their child did not participate in sexual activity voluntarily and that
they were not failures as parents).
51. E.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984) (admitting the account of a
clinical psychologist, who had been asked to validate the claim of abuse, because the
child was unavailable); see also Skoler, supra note 45, at 17; infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines for expert investigation of abuse).
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sponse as conclusive on that question of fact. 112 In effect, the affirmative response tells the fact finder that the alleged events
occurred, so there is no need to await the complete presentation
of the evidence.
In which cases does the potential undercutting of the goals of
the adversary process occur? The most likely situations are
those where the checks built into the adversary system are not
able to function: when testing and probing are impossible or ineffective, or when the testimony is presented in such a manner
that the fact finder is permitted to reach a conclusion without
hearing the full presentation. Although this can occur in any factual situation, it is most likely when the system asks the intervenor to perform multiple or poorly-defined roles and places
heavy reliance on the intervenor because of the lack of physical
or other corroborating evidence.

II.

THE INTERVENOR IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

Although the courts generally embrace innovative theoretical
developments concerning the dynamics of child sexual abuse
and admit expert testimony describing it,6 3 some courts express
reservations about the evidence and how it has been derived. 114
A.

Recent Cases

In People v. Roscoe/' 11 the court refused to allow a psychologist
to testify in the government's case-in-chief about the specific
facts of a child sexual abuse case or to inform the jury of his
diagnosis that the complainant was the victim of sexual abuse. 116
52. E.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985).
53. E.g., Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 688 P.2d 326 (1984); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App.
453, 706 P.2d 1009 (1985); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984); State v.
Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667
P.2d 96 (1983).
54. E.g., Colgan v. State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the validation of child sexual abuse by a therapist may not have gained scientific acceptance,
but it was not reversible error to admit); Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769
(1985).
55. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
56. In Roscoe, the victim was a 15-year-old boy who allegedly was molested by his
neighbor on several occasions. Although the defendant did not testify, he denied culpability through his attorney. Id. at 1096, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 47. The government called the
boy's therapist in its case-in-chief to discuss in detail the account given by the victim
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In reaching this determination, the court relied heavily on People v. Bledsoe,r.7 which it interpreted as establishing a broad
prohibition against "misuse of psychologists' testimony."& 8 The
misuse refers to the introduction of the diagnosis of a psychologist who is engaged in a therapeutic relationship with the victim
and thus has a professional duty to help him. The Roscoe court
characterized testimony of this type as an effort by the government to have the psychologist decide the case for the jury-that
and to explain why he concluded that the boy was a victim of ongoing molestation. Id. at
1098 n.2, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49 n.2. The court ruled that the admission of the testimony
was error, although not one requiring reversal. The court added that expert testimony
would have been admissible as rebuttal evidence or to describe child sexual abuse in
general terms. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
57. 36 Cal. 3d 236,681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). The question presented in
Bledsoe was the admissibility of evidence of rape trauma syndrome in the government's
case-in-chief as substantive evidence to prove a rape had occurred. The court rejected
the use of rape trauma syndrome evidence for that purpose, although it reserved judgment on the evidence's admissibility for other purposes.
In Bledsoe, the court focused on whether rape trauma syndrome testimony would meet
the tests for admissibility of new scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It acknowledged that such testimony had been offered in
numerous cases to rebut the defense of consent, but distinguished these cases by noting
that in the case at bar, the evidence was not offered to rebut misconceptions about the
presumed behavior of rape victims, but to prove that a rape had occurred. The court
distinguished evidence of rape trauma syndrome from other scientific methods of proof,
such as battered child syndrome, and concluded that rape trauma syndrome
was not devised to determine the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particular past
event-Le., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred-but rather was
developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify,
predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors' clients or
patients.
36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The court emphasized that
the role of the counselor is to provide services to the client, not to make a judgment
about whether a "real" rape occurred or the victim's credibility. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at
300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
The court went on to remark that rape counselors normally do not probe inconsistencies in their clients' descriptions of the facts or conduct independent investigations to
confirm the allegations, id., for their function is merely to help their clients. Therefore,
the historical accuracy of the client's account is not of great importance to them. The
court concluded that because rape trauma syndrome was developed for purposes different from those of the battered child syndrome and does not consist of a narrow set of
criteria or symptoms whose presence demonstrates the client has been raped, it is inadmissible to prove the witness was raped. Id. at 251-52, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr.
at 460; see also State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663
S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984). But see State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982). Cf.
State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161,175,689 P.2d 822,832 (1984) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting) (urging the court to reexamine its decision in Marks allowing the testimony of rape
trauma syndrome). See generally Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape:
The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985); Note, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 301 (1984).
58. 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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is, to tell the jury to accept the doctor's diagnosis and then conclude the defendant is guilty. 119
The court's underlying concern in Roscoe was that a jury
would defer to a mental health professional who was not under a
duty to investigate the accuracy of the patient's account. The
court theorized that the professional's task was to assist the
complainant with his emotional needs, not to make a judgment
that an offense occurred in a legal sense. Thus, although an expert's description about characteristics and behavior of abuse
victims in general would be proper, especially as rebuttal evidence, the use of the testimony as substantive evidence in the
case-in-chief was not appropriate. 60
People v. Payan 61 also analyzed the misuse of testimony given
by an expert who stands in a therapeutic relationship with the
purported victim. In Payan, the trial court permitted a physician to testify that three children had been sexually molested.
The physician's opinion was based on a review of police and
medical reports and a preliminary hearing transcript, not on interviews with the children. The appellate court noted that the
physician did not have a patient-therapist relationship with the
children and referred to the victims as a class in reaching the
conclusion, 62 thus overcoming two hurdles set by Bledsoe. The
court expressed some reservations about the doctor giving an
opinion on whether the children had been molested, 63 but con59. Id. at 1100-01, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
60. Id.
61. 220 Cal. Rptr.-126 (Ct. App. 1985).
62. Id. at 130. As the court explained in People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093,
1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985):
The language [of Bledsoe) suggests-although it does not explicitly require-that the opinion testimony must be based upon the literature in the field
and the general professional experience of the witness rather than upon an analysis and diagnosis based upon a review and evaluation of the facts in the .case at
hand. Thus, for example, a victim whose credibility is attacked for initially denying that he had been molested could be rehabilitated by expert testimony that
such denials are more likely than not in molestation cases. The testimony would
not be that this particular child was a victim of molestation, causing him to react
in a certain way, but rather that as a class victims of molestation typically make
poor witnesses, and are reluctant to disclose or discuss the sordid episodes.
63. In resolving the problem of admitting the physician's opinion about children
whom she had never seen, the court noted that an expert may base an opinion upon
hearsay and may rely on reports and opinions of other physicians. 220 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
It commented that simply because the expert opinion coincides with an ultimate issue of
fact, including the credibility of a witness, that would not make it inadmissible: Id. at
133. The court cautioned that expert testimony on child sexual abuse may not always be
admissible, but that it is properly admitted if it will aid the jury in understanding factors
that influence a child's behavior or in explaining the presence or absence of medical
findings. Id.
In Payan, the three children testified about the abuse, several witnesses related hearsay statements made by the children, and a second physician testified about their physi-
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eluded the trial court's "careful admonishments" to the jury had
cured any error. 84
Roscoe and Payan highlight an unspoken concern that is developing in some circles about the· limits of expert testimony in
child sexual abuse cases. 811 Although these courts described the
problem as a potential misuse of expert testimony, other courts
are less specific in their rationale for disapproving the use of
such testimony. For example, in State v. Logue, 88 the trial court
permitted a social worker to testify that, in her opinion, the
four-year-old complainant had gained his sexual knowledge
through his experience with the defendant. The South Dakota
Supreme Court held that the possibility of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the testimony, and that the trial
court had abused its discretion in admitting the opinion. 87 The
cal condition. The expert testified in detail about child sexual abuse and about the child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome in general terms before being asked her opinion
about whether or not these children had been molested. The court took great pains to
discuss the general testimony on sexual abuse and to describe its importance for cases of
this type. Id. at 128. The court's conclusion that the admission of the opinion on molestation was not error seems to have been compelled more by the quality of the other
evidence in the case than by the propriety of such an opinion in itself.
The court did not address whether the physician's opinion would have been given
credence in the medical community. The "validation" process-determining the validity
of a complaint of sexual abuse-seems to anticipate a combination of investigative interviewing and credibility assessment of the child. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, Validation of
Child Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 39, 40. Personal interviews are described as the preferred method for accomplishing this, because of the difficulty in assessing the factual basis of the allegations and fitting them into the patterns and dynamics of sexual abuse. It appears inconsistent to have developed a detailed method for
validation of child sexual abuse claims that relies on the child as the primary data
source, and then to circumvent it in the manner employed in Payan. Reliance on secondary sources is appropriate for some aspects of managing child sexual abuse cases, such as
peer review. But permitting this kind of expert opinion in the setting of a criminal case
appears to weaken the foundation of reliability and helpfulness that is the prerequisite
to admissibility. The limiting instructions given in Payan and the quality of other evidence in the case appear to have been the basis for the court's refusal to find error.
64. The instructions were that the physician had not personally interviewed the children, that her opinion was based solely on her review of the records, and that the jury
must determine for itself whether the facts assembled by the doctor in reaching her conclusions were supported by the evidence. 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
Importantly, the court distinguished testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome, see infra note 125, from that on rape trauma syndrome, see supra note 57,
arguing that the former describes a method of clinically diagnosing abuse and is not a
therapeutic tool, so its admission into evidence would not be a misapplication of medical
findings. 220 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
65. E.g., Graham, supra note 6, at 60-61; Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97 (1985).
66. 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985).
67. Id. at 157.
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court expressed general discomfort with the evidence because it
was not, and could not be, supported by any claim of scientific
exactitude or empiricism. 68 It agreed that jurors are at a disadvantage in judging the credibility of children in such cases, but
concluded that couching the social worker's assessment in the
guise of an expert opinion "lent a stamp of undue legitimacy to
her testimony."69 A complicating factor not specifically addressed by the court was that the social worker served as the
investigator, hearsay chronicler, and expert witness. 70
The themes developed in these cases reveal some of the difficulties courts experience with the participation of professionals
as witnesses in child sexual abuse cases. Potential misuse of the
expert testimony is at the center of the controversy, with some
courts emphasizing the therapeutic relationship, and other
courts expressing a more generalized fear that the expert's nonscientifically-based conclusions will improperly sway the jury. In
expressing concern over the misuse of expert testimony, the
courts hint at a potential impediment to the resolution of child
sexual abuse cases in court: the performance of multiple or
poorly-defined roles by the intervenors. This concern over the
functions performed seems to be grounded in a commitment to
the proper working of the adversary system-a commitment
that the system maintain the testing and probing of the evidence on both sides of a dispute and preclude the fact finder
from reaching premature conclusions on only a partial or biased
presentation of evidence.

B. Functions Performed by the Intervenor
In recent years, the legal system has asked intervenors to perform any or all of four distinct functions in cases alleging child
sexual abuse. First, the individual conducts an investigation to
determine whether or not the acts occurred. 71 In the past, law
enforcement officials performed this task, with occasional advice
from protective service workers. Now, in many jurisdictions, po68. Id.; see D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: CAN JUSTICE SURVIVE THE Soc1AL Sc1ENCEs? 23-27 (1980); Comment, The Psychologist As Expert Witness: Science in the
Courtroom, 38 Mo. L. REV. 539 (1979); see also Raifman, Problems of Diagnosis and
Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, BEHAVIORAL SCI.
& L., Summer 1983, at 115.
69. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157.
70. Id. at 154, 156, 159.
71. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
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lice departments defer to a child sexual abuse professional who
performs the investigation for the state. Second, the child sexual
abuse professional preserves in some fashion the child's account
of events. 72 If allowed by the hearsay rules of the jurisdiction,
the professional may be asked to recount the child's story at the
trial of the alleged perpetrator. Third, the intervenor serves as
an expert witness at trial to explain objectively to the fact finder
what child sexual abuse is and how it occurs. 73 Frequently, this
amounts to a description of the circumstances under which
abuse ordinarily takes place, thus destroying myths about sexual
abuse. Finally, the professional may serve as an advocate for the
child. 74 Frequently, he or she will be an intermediary between
the child and the prosecution, court, and jury. When needed, the
advocacy role includes physical protection as well as emotional
support. In effect, the professional becomes the representative
and spokesperson for the child.
1. Investigative function- Traditionally, the police have investigated alleged criminal acts of any type. 711 Investigation permits a societal response to the allegations through apprehension
and punishment of the offender or a determination that no
crime has been committed. Police investigators ordinarily use a
number of methods to determine what happened, including:
the search and recording of the crime scene, the collection and preservation of evidence, the application of modus operandi techniques, the uncovering of all sources of
information, the surveillance of suspects, their interview
and interrogation, the interview of witnesses and victims,
and the obtaining of search and arrest warrants through
the courts. 76
Experience with cases of child sexual abuse has led to a reevaluation of the roles of law enforcement officers in such investigations. The facts of child sexual abuse cases often do not fit
the pattern of traditional crimes, so many investigative methods
72. See infra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
75. Responsibility for investigating criminal acts generally is assigned by statute.
E.g., S.D. ComFIED LAWS § 22-1-1(20) (Supp. 1986) (defining law enforcement officer as
one "who is responsible for the prevention or detection of crimes"); id. § 23-3-12 (1979)
(duty of the division of criminal investigation to prevent and detect violations of the laws
of the state).
76. A. GERMANN, F. DAY & R. GALLATI, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 206 (1969).
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are ineffective. Physical evidence may have disappeared; the
crime scene may yield nothing of importance, making a search
warrant· unnecessary; and the surveillan<::e of suspects is irrelevant if the child knows the identity of the perpetrator. 77 In such
cases, the interviews of the victim, witnesses, and the victim's
family become much more important than in cases that do not
involve sexual abuse. 78
Police techniques for interviewing victims of all types of sex
crimes have been criticized in recent years. In children's cases,
the insensitivity and frequency of the interviews are the most
often cited problems. 79 Motivated in large part by the complaints of adult rape victims that they have been revictimized by
the investigative process, 80 police departments have sought alter77. Compare State v. ·Garay, 453 So. 2d 1003 (La. App. 1984) (case based on the
child's testimony about defendant whom she knew and the testimony of social workers in
orphanage where the victim resided; no crime scene evidence or medical evidence; identification not in issue) and State v. Wrightington, 323 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1982) (child
reported the incident to her mother who failed to act; five days later, the child informed
a school counselor who told police; case based on circumstantial evidence not derived
from police investigation) and Commonwealth v. Brenner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 465
N.E.2d 1229 (1984) (indecent assault report made by a seven-year-old girl three to four
months after the incident; case was based on a fresh complaint of child to mother, friend,
and friend's mother) with State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. 1980) (complaint
was made shortly after the incident; police search of the crime scene revealed physical
evidence (tissues) and a medical exam of the victim showed anal intercourse had occurred) and State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1984) (police interviews of 13-yearold girl).
.
Often the police will retain the task of questioning the defendant, see, e.g., State v.
· Bounds, 71 Or. App. 744, 694 P.2d 566 (1985), although the intervenor may do so in
some circumstances, e.g., State v. Neblock, 75 Or. App. 587, 706 P.2d 1020 (1985) (social
worker who received the complaint interviewed the child and then interviewed the alleged perpetrator; at trial, the defendant argued that the social worker's statement to
him, saying that he had to take responsibility for his actions and get treatment, was a
promise of treatment instead of incarceration in return for a confession).
78. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, J.
Soc. lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 125; Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48
("[I]nvestigative interviewing is the most important component of the validation process.
It . . . affords the best opportunity to collect pertinent information . . . [because in
most cases,) there will be little or no physical evidence ... to support the allegation").
79. See J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 9-13 (discussing negative aspects
of legal intervention and suggesting more sensitive techniques); V. DE FRANCIS, supra
note 9, at 4 (stating that repeated police interviews and the fervor of investigators to
apprehend the offender may cause little or no concern to be shown for the child victim);
Porter, Blick & .Sgroi, Treatment of the Sexually Abused Child, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, at 115-16 (skepticism by police and others in authority is- a problem for the
child); Comment, Incest and the Legal System: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 12 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 673, 680-84 (1979); see also Graves & Sgroi, Law Enforcement and Child
Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 321 (advising law enforcement officers how
to conduct interviews with children, emphasizing establishing rapport, interviewing for
facts, and° evaluating victims).
80. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OuR WILL 364-66 (1975); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1977); see
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natives to their traditional involvement in such sex crime investigations. One option has been to provide special training for officers who interrogate victims of sex crimes. 81 Other departments
have elected to conduct a joint investigation or to defer to social
service agencies, particularly where a child victim is involved. 82
Thus, in many cases, intervenors have become adjuncts or
replacements for the police in this stage of the investigative
process.
Faced with the challenge of investigating allegations of child
sexual abuse, experts in the field have developed guidelines to be
followed. 83 The focus differs markedly from the traditional police investigation-the statement of the victim and the investigator's familiarity with theories about the dynamics of child sexual abuse are the key factors. 84
Validation by the intervenor of a complaint of child sexual
abuse often begins with an investigative interview with the child
for purposes of both fact-finding and creating a therapeutic effect on the child. 811 The interview provides the opportunity to
obtain the child's account of the sexual abuse and to allow the
interviewer to observe and evaluate the child's demeanor. 86
also Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis
Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 156 (1978); Resick &
Jackson, Attitudes Toward Rape· Among Mental Health Professionals, 9 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 481 (1981).
81. E.g., Boerma, How to Overcome Barriers and to Develop Creative and Innovative
Approaches in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in PAPERS FROM NATIONAL
POLICY CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 35.
82. For example, in State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985), the social worker
acknowledged that she had conducted the investigation for the state. Id. at 154-55; see
also J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 9-13; Graves & Sgroi, supra note 79, at
310.
83. E.g., Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 39-79; Sgroi, An Approach to Case
Management, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 81.
Certainly, in a traditional police investigation, interviews with the victim are of paramount importance. But with allegations of child sexual abuse, the other evidence normally found to support the claim is absent, and the investigator is forced to rely on his
or her knowledge of the dynamics of sexual abuse as supporting evidence. This is analogous to the use of modus operandi techniques. See infra note 92.
84. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40; Sgroi, supra note 83, at 91.
85. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48 (arguing that although the primary purpose of the interview is fact-finding, there will be a clinical effect on the child
that can be either traumatic or therapeutic, so the interviewer should structure the interview to be therapeutic).
86. See id. at 69. Dr. Sgroi ·explains that in conjunction with the fact-finding task, the
intervenor must assess the credibility of the child. In Dr. Sgroi's framework:
(d]etermining the validity of an allegation of child sexual abuse is first and foremost a matter of belief. You either believe the child's story or you do not. If you
require that there be corroboration of the child's story by physical evidence, wit-
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In conjunction with assessing the credibility of the child
through his or her demeanor and response to questions, the interviewer should review the child's account in light of the commonly described behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse. 87
There must also be an analysis of the dynamics of abuse, including the pattern of abuse, the behavior of the abuser, the possibility of multiple incidents over time, a progression of sexual activity, elements of secrecy, pressure or coercion by the abuser, and
detailed descriptions of sexual behavior. 88 There is no precise
formula for measuring the existence of abuse based on these factors. 89 The presence or absence of one or more indicators is not
conclusive, but is only one piece of evidence for the investigator
to consider.
Investigators have an immensely difficult task when the only
pieces of evidence are the child's allegation and an account that
fits a recognized pattern, unaccompanied by physical evidence or
other factors to support the claim. In such cases, the conclusion
that the allegation is founded rests in large part on factors that
are not independently verifiable.90 More importantly, the invesnesses, or a confession by the perpetrator, you will turn many cases into "noncases."

Id.
87. The behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse include: (1) overly compliant behavior; (2) aggressive behavior; (3) pseudomature behavior; (4) hints about sexual activity; (5) sexually aggressive behavior or persistent and inappropriate sexual play with
peers, toys, or themselves; (6) detailed and age-inappropriate understanding of sexual
behavior; (7) early arrival and late departure from school; (8) poor peer relationships; (9)
lack of trust; (10) nonparticipation in school and social activities; (11) inability to concentrate in school; (12) sudden drop in school performance; (13) extraordinary fear of
males; (14) seductive behavior; (15) running away from home; (16) sleep disturbances;
(17) regressive behavior; (18) withdrawal; (19) clinical depression; and (20) suicidal feelings. Sgroi,Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40°41; see also R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, supra
note 1, at 51-53; Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of IntraFamily Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Development, in CHILD SEXUAL ABusE AND
THE LAW 166, 171-72 (J. Bulkley 4th ed. 1983).
88. Dr. Sgroi has summarized the dynamics of abuse as follows:
Child sexual abuse nearly always involves a known perpetrator who uses nonviolent means (pressure, persuasion, bribery) based on his or her position of power
or authority to engage a child in sexual behavior. The sexual activity will probably begin with less intimate behavior (exposure, masturbation, fondling) and
progress to various types of sexual penetration .... There will probably be multiple episodes of sexual activity between the perpetrator and the child over time.
The perpetrator is likely to pressure or persuade the child to keep their sexual
activity a secret from others. The child is likely to maintain the secrecy over a
long period of time . . . .
Sgroi, supra note 83, at 89-90; see also Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, supra note 87, at 171;
Conte, The Justice System and Sexual Abuse of Children, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 556, 55762 (1984).
89. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40.
90. Id. at 69.
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tigator's judgment that the complaint is truthful takes on
greater significance as the case proceeds through the criminal
justice system, for that conclusion may singularly determine the
case outcome. Such a result is especially likely where other evidence at trial is minimal. 91
The methods used by the child sexual abuse professional as
investigator have been a marked departure from investigative
methods of the past. The challenging, probing police officer, who
exhibits skepticism toward the victim's account and seeks corroboration of it through physical evidence, has been replaced by
a person with an accepting, supportive demeanor, who may be
satisfied that the complaint is validated if the child is believable
and the account fits a recognized pattern of sexual abuse. Moreover, the use of the intervenor's judgment that a crime has been
committed as evidence in the prosecution of the case is a significant change as compared to the impact of an investigating officer's conclusion. Ordinarily, the police investigator is limited to
fact-based testimony at trial, not opinion testimony that the
crime occurred as the victim has alleged. 92
The tenor of the investigation has changed as child sexual
abuse professionals have become involved in the process. Investigation is but one of the tasks that the system has assigned
them, however, and the intertwining of the investigative role
91. E.g., State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D; 1985) (social worker gave her opinion
that the child had gained his sexual knowledge from experience with the defendant).
One problem that intervenors seem not to have addressed is the use of threats of criminal prosecution. Many experts believe that the potential for prosecution is a powerful
and effective inducement by which to obtain the defendant's cooperation in treatment.
E.g., R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, supra note 1, at 53; J. SELINSKE, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE
INTERVENTION WITH THE SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILD 16 (1980) (information paper published by National Professional Resource Center for Child Abuse & Neglect); Sgroi,
supra note 83, at 106-07; Skoler, supra note 45, at 47. If the ·intervenor has approached
the investigation with the idea that the alleged perpetrator would not be prosecuted, but
only given treatment, that might influence the degree of care the intervenor uses when
conducting the investigation.
92. A law enforcement officer may be qualified to give an expert opinion on certain
issues-e.g. modus operandi-that would be beyond the experience of most jurors. E.g.,
United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981). Ordinarily, that testimony is restricted to a general description of methods and techniques, and does not include the
officer's opinion on the credibility of specific witnesses in the case. Testimony on the
dynamics of sexual abuse may be analogous to the law enforcement officer's description
of modus operandi, but the addition of an opinion on credibility by the child sexual
abuse intervenor is a significant departure from the limits of that testimony. Compare
People v. McDaniels, 107 Cal. App. 3d 898, 902-05, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 14-16 (1980) with
People v. Brown, 116 Cal. App. 3d 820, 827-29, 172 Cal. Rptr. 221, 224-25 (1981). See
also Note, Police Expert Witnesses and the Ultimate Issue Rule, 44 LA. L. REV. 211
(1983).
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with their other functions should be explored to develop a full
picture of their participation in child sexual abuse cases.
2. Chronicler- Generally, statutes assign the duty to investigate allegations of child sexual abuse to a state agency. 93 As a
practical matter, the intervenor conducts an extensive interview
not only to discover the child's version of events, 94 but also to
transcribe it in some form for later use in the criminal process.
Preserving the child's account may be by a method as sophisticated as videotaping, 911 or as mundane as written notes.
The interviewer's version of the child's account may be used
in pretrial proceedings or in the trial itself. 96 In many cases, the
statement is repeated in front of a grand jury and at the preliminary hearing. Occasionally, the interviewer uses the child's statement informally to convince the defendant to attend treatment
or to enter a guilty plea. 97 At trial, the role of the interviewer in
testifying about the child's statements will depend on the statutes in the jurisdiction that admit hearsay and on the availability of the child to testify. If admitted, the interviewer's testimony may be offered in addition to other hearsay versions of the
events in question or may be the sole account, depending on how
the events were reported and investigated. 98
a. Hearsay rules 99 - The statements of child witnesses in
sexual abuse cases 100 may fall under the residual exceptions to
93. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-12 (1984); id. § 26-10-12.1 (Supp. 1986) (upon
receipt of a report of child abuse, an investigation shall be made by the department of
social services, the county sheriff, or the city police).
94. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48-69 (providing detailed methodology for interviewing an alleged victim of child sexual abuse).
95. See supra note 6.
96. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987) (statement made by the child "is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings"). The statements also may be used in other
proceedings, such as dependent and neglected actions, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8-32.5
(1984) or actions pursuant to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-10-1 (1984).
97. See supra note 91.
98. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
.
99. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Federal Rule of Evidence 802 establishes that
hearsay is not admissible unless the Rules themselves authorize an exception or Congress
or the Supreme Court so prescribes. In theory, hearsay evidence is excluded because it is
unreliable and, in criminal cases, because it denies the defendant the right to confront
his accuser. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 159 (1970); see also FED. R. Evm. art. VIII advisory committee's note; 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 11, § 1367 (extolling the benefits of cross-examination of witnesses). See generally Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court Statement of
Sexual Abuse at Trial, in CHILD SEXUAL .ABusE AND THE LAW, supra note 87, at 153.
100. The challenge presented by child witnesses is not new. In his discussion of offenses against persons, Blackstone instructs:
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the hearsay rule 101 or under other specific exceptions or exclusions, 102 particularly res gestae, 103 spontaneous exclamation,1°"'
Moreover, if the rape be charged to be committed on an infant under twelve
years of age, she may still be a competent witness, if she has sense and understanding to know the nature and obligations of an oath; or even to be sensible of
the wickedness of telling a deliberate lie. Nay, though she hath not, it is thought
by Sir Matthew Hale that she ought to be heard without oath, to give the court
information; and others have held, that what a child told her mother, or other
relations, may be given in evidence, since the nature of the case admits frequently of no better proof.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *214. Blackstone concedes that such a proposal had
not received wide acceptance in his day, and, in fact, hearsay testimony of the account of
a child not competent to take an oath would not be permitted in such a situation. He
advises that if a child is permitted to testify about such an offense, there "should be
some concurrent testimony of time, place and circumstances, in order to make out the
fact; and that the conviction should not be grounded singly on the unsupported accusation of an infant under years of discretion." Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 11, at 9.
101. FED. R. Evm. 803(24) (declarant available); FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5) (declarant
unavailable). The catchall exceptions to the hearsay rule were enacted to codify the discretion that judges had claimed over issues of admissibility before the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules provide that, where evidence i~ proffered, but does
not fit into the specific categories delineated in Rules 803 and 804 as exceptions to the
prohibition against hearsay, the judge is granted discretion to admit the testimony if it
has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the listed exceptions.
Then the court must determine that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (b) it is more probative on the point for which it was offered than any other
evidence that the prosecution could secure through reasonable means, and (c) the general purposes of the rules and the interests of justice would best be served by admission.
The proponent must also give notice to the defendant of an intention to offer the hearsay under a residual exception. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29,
11 803(04]; Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978); see also State v. Bounds, 71 Or.
App. 744, 694 P.2d 566 (1985) (holding that the mother's account of an unavailable fouryear-old child's statement was admissible under the residual exception); State v. Taylor,
103 N.M. 189, 704 P.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that although part of a three-yearold child's statement was admissible under the residual exception, identification of the
defendant as perpetrator did not meet the tests for admissibility and must be excluded).
102. Only about half of the states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those
that have not adopted these rules rely on statutory or common law evidentiary principles
to resolve questions of admissibility. In many instances, the common law rules overlap
exceptions listed in the Federal Rules. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
See generally Graham, supra note 6, at 22.
103. FED. R. Evm. 803(1), 803(3); see Sparks v. State, 172 Ga. App. 891, 324 S.E.2d
824 (1984); State v. Garay, 453 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Jolly v. State, 681
S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (mother's statement to her brother about abuse of her
child). But see Commonwealth v. Kasko, 322 Pa. Super. 62, 469 A.2d 181 (1983) (holding
that res gestae does not apply where the mother catches her child engaging in sexual
contact with another child and interrogates them to find out who taught them about
sex); State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
104. FED. R. Evm. 803(2) (excited utterances); see United States v. Iron Shell, 633
F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo.
448, 615 P.2d 720 (1980); State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan. App. 2d 353, 657 P.2d 79 (1983);
State v. Ramos, 203 N.J. Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (1985); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76,
337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985); State v. Bult, 351
N.W.2d 731 (S.D. 1984); State v. Bouchard, 31 Wash. App. 381, 639 P.2d 761 (1982);
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statement made for medical diagnosis, m or fresh complaint. 106
Although many courts· have relied on these provisions to admit
children's statements, critics charge that they are inadequate for
sexual abuse cases. Several commentators argue that the
residual exceptions are unsatisfactory because (1) courts interpret them to apply only in unusual cases; (2) they were not intended· to create a new class of exceptions; and (3) courts still
must make the determinations specified in the hearsay rule, so
they will not necessarily admit the statements. 107 Likewise, the
specific exceptions listed in the hearsay rule have been found
ineffective. 108 The language and the purpose of the exceptions
have posed barriers to the admission of testimony in many cases,
State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
victim's statements made three days after the assault were excited utterances). But see
State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (finding that a time lapse of
two to three hours and a lack of excitement preclude admission as spontaneous exclamation); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984) (holding that a statement
not made until the morning after the assault, compounded by leading questions by the
mother, prevented admission as excited utterance; however, the statements were admissible under the statutory child sexual abuse exception).
105. FED. R. Ev10. 803(4); see United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985)
(allowing victim's statement about injury and identity of a perpetrator who is a member
of the same household on the theory that such statement is pertinent to the victim's
treatment for psychological injury); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Honick v. Walden, 10 Md. App. 714, 272 A.2d
406 (1971); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); State v. Bouchard, 31
Wash. App. 381, 639 P.2d 761 (1982). But see Hassel v. State, 607 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) (holding that a statement was not admissible because it discussed the
cause of the injuries, not the injuries themselves).
106. Commonwealth v. Brenner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 465 N.E.2d 1229 (1984) (report of seven-year-old girl to a friend three to four months after the incident); State v.
Wrightington, 323 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1982); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545 (S.D.
1971) (twelve-year-old victim; delay of 67 to 82 days between intercourse and the complaint). Contra State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). In Williams,
the court held that a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation occurred where
the child did not testify. The defendant and the stepfather both had access to the child
during the time in question. Although the court admitted a fresh complaint through the
mother's testimony, it concluded that details, including identification of the defendant as
perpetrator, were not admissible under these circumstances.
107. See McGrath & Clemens, The Child Victim As A Witness in Sexual Abuse
Cases, 46 MONT. L. REV. 229 (1985); Skoler, supra note 45, at 8 (arguing residual exceptions are too strict for child sexual abuse cases); Note, supra note 45, at 1763. For a
general discussion of the residual exceptions, see Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions
to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
867, 905 (1982) (tracing the development and application of residual exceptions; arguing
that they should not be used to expand hearsay rules and exceptions "beyond recognition"). But see Imwinkelried, supra note 101 (tracing the history and legislative intent of
residual exceptions; arguing that the ambiguity of the language and intent justifies a
broad interpretation).
108. See McGrath & Clemens, supra note 107, at 234-35; Skoler, supra note 45, at 7
(fitting sexual abuse within the traditional exceptions requires a strained interpretation
of the exceptions); Note, supra note 45, at 1755 ("spontaneous exclamation" exception
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although, in many others, the courts have given the rules an expansive interpretation in order to admit the evidence. 109
Recently, several states have adopted the suggestion that
hearsay testimony in child sexual abuse cases be admitted pursuant to a specific rule. 110 This new exception has been in lieu
treats children as if they were adults because it is built on the premise that they will
have the psychology, behavior, and experience of adults, and will react accordingly).
109. E.g., People v. Stewart, 39 Colo. App. 142, 568 P.2d 65, 68 (1977) ("Moreover, as
regards sex crimes against children there is authority that the rule be applied more liberally."); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86-90, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841-43 (1985) (approving a
"broad and liberal" interpretation of what constitutes an excited utterance when applied
to young children); State v. Ramos, 203 N.J. Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (1985); State v.
Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985) (where the declarant is a young child, the mere lapse
of time does not disqualify the statement as an excited utterance); see also 2 C. ToRCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 300 n.31 (13th ed. 1972).
110. A typical statute reads:
STATEMENT OF SEX CRIME VICTIM UNDER AGE TEN. A statement made by a child
under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact or rape performed with
or on the child by the defendant, not otherwise admissible by statute or court
rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings against the defendant in
the courts of this state if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness.
However, if the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act.
No statement may be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the
statement makes known his intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the declarant[,) to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987); see also WASH. REv. CoDE § 9A.44.120 (Supp.
1987). For a list of states that have adopted the exception, see supra note 5. See generally Note, Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1985); Note, State v. McCafferty: The Conflict Between
a Defendant's Right to Confrontation and the Need for Childrens' Hearsay Statements
in Sexual Abuse Cases, 30 S.D.L. REV. 663 (1985); Note, Confronting Child Victims of
Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PuGET SouND L. REV. 387 (1984); Note, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's New
Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REv. 813 (1983).
Kansas has enacted a different type of statute altogether. It creates an exception for
the statements of a child in a criminal proceeding or in a proceeding to determine
whether the child is deprived or in need of care. It reads:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay
evidence and inadmissible except: ... (dd) In a criminal proceeding or in a proceeding pursuant to the Kansas juvenile offender's code or in a proceeding to
determine if a child is a child in need of care under the Kansas code for care of
children, a statement made by a child, to prove the crime or that the child is a
juvenile offender or a child in need of care, if: (1) The child is alleged to be a
victim of the crime or offense or a child in need of care; and (2) the trial judge
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of, m or in addition to, a residual exception in the jurisdiction. 112
Such "child hearsay" statutes express a legislative intent that
statements of young children that describe acts of sexual abuse
and that meet the threshold requirements-the time, content,
and circumstances of the statement must provide sufficient indicia of reliability 113-should be admitted at trial. These statutes,
regardless of their efficacy, establish the ideological foundation
for the admission of children's accounts of sexual abuse. 114
b. Obtaining and using information- The child sexual
abuse professional is one of many sources for obtaining information about sexual abuse from a child. With the renunciation of
this function by many law enforcement agencies, however, the
finds, after a hearing on the matter, that the child is disqualified or unavailable
as a witness, the statement is apparently reliable and the child was not induced
to make the statement falsely by use of threats or promises.
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to a jury, the
trial judge shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight
and credit to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it
shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made, any possible threats or
promises that might have been made to the child to obtain the statement and
any other relevant factor.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986). See generally McNeil, The Admissibility of
Child Victim Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense Perspectiue, 23 WASHBURN L. J. 265 (1984).
-111. WASH. REv. CoDE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987).
112. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987) (child sexual abuse exception); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-16-28, 19-16-35 (1979) (residual exceptions).
113. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 379 N.W.2d 295 (S.D. 1985), where the defendant
was convicted of rape and sexual contact with his son. The state relied on the child
hearsay exception, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987), to introduce statements of the
child made to his mother and to a police officer. The state made an offer of proof of the
contents of the statements. The defense was permitted to cross-examine the officer, but
not the mother. The defense motion to exclude the statements was denied. Accordingly,
the state offered them as substantive evidence in its case-in-chief. On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded, stating that the hearsay statute contemplates a
trial court determination of the reliability of the statements, including an assessment of
the age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of abuse, the relationship of
the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertions, and the reliability of the child
witness. 379 N.W.2d at 297. It may not simply issue a perfunctory denial of the defense
motion to exclude without making the requisite findings. Id. at 298; accord State v.
Spronk, 379 N.W.2d 312 (S.D. 1985).
114. Courts generally have adopted the ideological foundation of these statutes. See,
e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 22, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) (declaring that a child's
statements about sexual abuse are inherently reliable; children will not persist in lies
about sexual abuse and do not have enough information about sexual matters to lie
about them); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D. 1984) (concluding that a
young child is unlikely to fabricate a graphic account of sexual activity because such
activity is beyond the realm of the child's experience).
Courts have not specifically relied on expert testimony at trial to support their justifications for finding the information reliable. Apparently, they have relied on their own
research into child sexual abuse literature. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the courts' use of expert testimony.
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child sexual abuse professional has become the most important
official agent for discovering and preserving the child's account.
Unofficial sources, such as parents and siblings, also are critical
participants in the gathering of information about the events
that may be used in court as hearsay testimony. In many cases,
these unofficial sources obtain a preliminary account and the official agent conducts a further investigation and questioning of
the child. m It is important to keep in mind that the intervenor's
function at this point is not only to investigate what happened,
but also to preserve in some fashion the substance of the child's
account for use in subsequent proceedings.
In an effort to preserve the child's account accurately and
completely, and to preclude challenges to the interviewer because of bias, several states have enacted legislation authorizing
the videotaping of the interviews between the intervenor and
child. 116 Such statutes anticipate that these tapes might be used
at trial instead of or in addition to the child's testimony. 117 In
most jurisdictions, sophisticated recording methods may be an
option, but are not employed routinely. 118 The usual procedure
is for the intervenor to conduct one or more interviews with the
child to establish a relationship that will enable the child to confide in the interviewer about the abuse. 119 The interview or series of interviews then will be condensed into a narrative report
that will be the source of the hearsay testimony given at trial.
The function of gathering and preserving the child's account
appears at first blush to fit neatly into the investigative service
performed by the intervenor. The dual roles of investigator and
hearsay recorder often have been accomplished by the same individual with little potential for undermining the goals of the
115. See Sgroi, Blick & Porter, supra note 2, at 17-21 (describing the typical circumstances of the disclosure of abuse).
116. See supra note 6.
117. But cf. Graham, supra note 6, at 62-67 (arguing that videotaping creates not
only confrontation issues, but problems with distortion and exclusion of evidence).
118. Some child advocates have argued that technological innovations in child sexual
abuse cases generally are not as effective as, for example, the use of the child sexual
abuse hearsay exception. A videotaped deposition may place the child and defendant in
close proximity without the judge being present, so the child's trauma may be increased.
The child still may have to testify at trial. Whitcomb, supra note 8, at 18-21.
Texas allows an ex parte videotaping session of the child's initial complaint, which in
theory could also be used in the government's case at trial in place of the child's live
testimony. TEx. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The statute has
been held unconstitutional by one Texas court, Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985), and constitutional by two others, Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). See
Graham, supra note 6, at 63-67.
119. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48-69.
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adversary system or the integrity of the functions being performed. This is not all the system demands of child sexual abuse
intervenors, however; these individuals are expected to serve as
experts 120 and advocates 121 as well. Potential problems become
apparent when the interplay of the four roles is examined. If the
expert and advocacy roles are combined to too large an extent,
they will tend to overshadow the neutrality the adversary system
asks of an investigator and recorder.
3. Expert- 122 As research into child sexual abuse has become more sophisticated, prosecutors have developed creative
ways to take advantage of such research at trial. If the facts of
the case warrant it, 123 the government prosecutor will call an expert witness to describe the dynamics of child sexual abuse 124
and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, 1211 on the theory the fact finder is not familiar with these concepts and the
expert testimony will aid in its decision. In some instances, this
testimony occurs in the government's case-in-chief; 126 in others,
it enters as rebuttal evidence 127 or in response to crossexamination.128
120. See infra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
121. See irifra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
122. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
123. Expert testimony ordinarily is not needed if the physical evidence is conclusive
or if other evidence exists so that the case is not simply the child's word against the
defendant's. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
124. E.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-10 (Minn. 1984); see supra note 88.
125. E.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-10 (Minn. 1984). See generally Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
177, 181 (1983). Dr. Summit explains that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
includes five categories: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction. Categories
(1) and (2) are preconditions to the occurrence of sexual abuse. The remaining three
categories are consequences that will vary with each case. See infra notes 132-33, 135
and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983); State v. Middleton,
294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) (testimony of county juvenile worker); State v. Maule,
35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
127. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985) (finding error in
admission of expert testimony in the case-in-chief rather than as rebuttal evidence);
State v. Clark, 682 P.2d 1339 (Mont. 1984); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d
1186 (1984).
128. E.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570,
688 P.2d 326 (1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State v.
Caulder, 75 Or. App. 457, 706 P.2d 1007 (1985); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683
P.2d 173 (1984).
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a. Subject matter- Substantively, the testimony of the expert will include a brief summary of the professional research
into child sexual abuse 129 and will emphasize the factors that are
important to the case at hand. Thus, if the case involves sexual
abuse by a parent or someone in a parental role, the testimony
may cover the influence of that relationship, especially over a
young victim. 130 The expert may relate that abuse takes place
over time, that normally it is not just a single incident, 131 and
that delays in reporting are common. 132 The witness may state
that it is usual for a child initially to deny the number of times
he or she was assaulted because of feeling guilty, filthy, and
afraid of upsetting the family. 133 In addition, experts generally
comment that it is unusual for children to fabricate graphic accounts of sexual activity 134 and that often the children's stories
129. E.g., D. FINKELHOR, supra note 2, at 53-72 (discussing factors relevant to describing the abusive experience); Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, supra note 87, at 171; Sgroi, Blick
& Porter, supra note 2, at 12-34 (explaining dynamics of child sexual abuse encounters
and profiling participants); see also Roe, supra note 65.
The testimony of experts is not admitted without some restrictions. One area of concern to courts is the use of statistics that identify the defendant as a member of a group
statistically more likely to have committed child abuse. Generally, that evidence is not
admissible. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984); State v. Claflin, 38
Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96
(1983).
130. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-09 (Minn. 1984); State v. Maule,
35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). For a detailed discussion of statistics on the
likelihood of abuse, see D. FINKELH0R, supra note 3, at 23-32.
131. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984); Maule, 35 Wash.
App. at 289-90, 667 P.2d at 97. This raises the problem of the introduction of other acts
of misconduct. Many courts liberally admit evidence of other acts of misconduct in cases
involving sexual abuse of children. See, e.g., State v. Keithley, 218 Neb. 707, 358 N.W.2d
76 (1984); State v. Thomas, 381 N.W.2d 232 (S.D. 1986); DeClouette v. State, 699 S.W.2d
341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985)
(finding that in the prosecution of sexual abuse of a three-year-old, evidence that the
defendant tried to entice a 13-year-old a week earlier was admissible, and noting that
there is greater latitude in admitting evidence of other acts in sexual abuse cases to
corroborate the victim's testimony against a credibility challenge). But see Weiner v.
State, 55 Md. App. 548, 464 A.2d 1096 (1983) (holding that it was error for the state to
introduce through the direct examination of complainant her sister's statement that defendant had abused her). See generally Comment, Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the
Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual Offense, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 217 (1985).
132. See, e.g., Smith, 100 Nev. at 571, 688 P.2d at 327; People v. Benjamin R., 103
A.D.2d 663, 668, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (1984); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 453, 454, 706
P.2d 1009, 1010 (1985); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566,569,683 P.2d 173, 176 (1984)
(expert testified that delays exist in 50% of child sexual abuse cases and that the delay is
longer if the victim knows the perpetrator); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 852, 690
P.2d 1186, 1190 (1984).
133. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984); State v. Clark, 682
P.2d 1339, 1351 (Mont. 1984).
134. See, e.g., W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 177 (Colo. 1984); State v. Myers, 359
N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. at 455, 706 P.2d at 1010; State
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are inconsistent or confused. 1311 In some cases, there is a poor
relationship between the mother and daughter, 136 a fear of
men, 137 and a victim who experiences nightmares with assaultive
content. 138 The testimony may indicate that the victim often
looks and acts older than he or she is, 139 and that the victims of
child sexual abuse have an unusual amount of sexual knowledge
for their age. uo Finally, the expert may testify about the ability
of a child to perceive and to describe a sexual contact. 10
The testimony of child abuse experts is not admitted without
reservation. Some courts have expressed discomfort with admitting testimony about child sexual abuse as a general phenomenon because it distracts the jury from the facts of the case it is
hearing. 1• 2 Other courts have commented that the scientific community has not yet generally accepted "validation"143 and other
bases of the expert's testimony, so the testimony should not be
allowed. 144 Nevertheless, when the child's account of abuse has
v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 290, 667 P.2d at 97. But see State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91
(Iowa 1986) (holding that it was error for the state to introduce opinion evidence that
young children do not lie about sexual abuse).
135. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984) (the child may become confused when she feels it isn't right, but the adult says it is); State v. Caulder, 75
Or. App. 457, 706 P.2d 1007 (1985).
136. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984). See generally D.
FINKELHOR, supra note 2, at 93-94, 120; Sgroi, Blick & Porter, supra note 2, at 28-29.
137. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Mimi. 1984).
138. Id.; see Tilelli, Turek & Jaffe, Sexual Abuse of Children: Clinical Findings and
Implications for Management, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 319, 322 (1980).
139. See, e.g., Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609; see also Sgroi, Blick & Porter, supra note 2,
at 31.
140. See, e.g., Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609; State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 453, 454, 706
P.2d 1009, 1010 (1985) (expert commenting that a child victim of sexual abuse may act
out sexually with others and may be highly curious about sexual anatomy).
141. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191
(1980), aff'd, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981) (the victim was an 11-year-old, mildly
retarded girl; pediatrician testified about reality testing-how children see the world and
fantasize-and concluded that the more limited the intelligence, the less ability there is
to fantasize); State v. Padilla, 74 Or. App. 676, 704 P.2d 524 (1985).
142. See Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985); State v. Maule, 35
Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). But see People v. Payan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct.
App. 1985); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 453, 706 P.2d 1009 (holding that testimony about
the "typical" victim of child sexual abu,se is permissible).
143. For an explanation of the "validation" process, see supra note 63.
144. See Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985). In Bussey, the problem was exacerbated because the child purportedly had been sexually abused by family
members other than the defendant. The court declined to permit testimony on child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome because the expert was not able to link the
child's secretiveness, fear, and guilt to abuse by the defendant. But see Payan, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 128-30 (rejecting the defendant's argument that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not generally accepted in the medical community).
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been impeached with prior inconsistent statements 1 n or challenged in cross-examination, the courts are more likely to admit
the expert testimony on the dynamics of sexual abuse 146 as rebuttal evidence.
If the court permits the expert to recite in general terms the
types of conduct to look for in verifying a child sexual abuse
complaint, it may then allow him or her to relate specific conduct in the complainant's case. 147 Whether the expert then may
offer an opinion that the child has been sexually abused is a
question that has created difficulty for courts. At least one court
has resolved the question by permitting the expert to give an
opinion on the credibility of the child. 146
Some courts, although rejecting an outright opinion by the expert on credibility, have allowed the expert to give what is in
essence such an opinion. Usually this opinion is couched in
terms of the symptoms of child sexual abuse and how the dynamics of abuse operate to make the child appear less reliable
then he or she is. 149 The courts acknowledge that such commen145. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State
v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
146. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 688 P.2d 326 (1984).
147. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983). The literature
indicates that a variety of symptoms might be indicators of child sexual abuse, but does
not quantify which symptoms must be present to establish a case of abuse. In addition,
because the symptoms listed are not necessarily the result of sexual abuse, the expert
must make the inductive leap from the existence of symptoms to a conclusion that child
sexual abuse occurred by incorporating other factors-for example, the child's complaint,
the quality of the symptoms, or a combination of symptoms in one child. See Sgroi,
Blick & Porter, supra note 2, at 10-27.
148. State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 602, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1982). But see Roe, supra
note 65, at 104 (opposing the introduction of expert opinion on credibility because of the
potential adverse impact on child-victims resulting from repetitious accounts of the abusive experiences and the possible inference that the child is mentally or emotionally
impaired).
Traditionally, the testimony of an expert on the credibility of a witness has not been
allowed because credibility is a matter within the expertise of the jury. The theory behind permitting such an opinion in a case of child sexual abuse appears to be the necessity of demonstrating to the jury that the account is believable because it is in accord
with symptoms that the expert would expect to find, and no other factors exist to rebut
the claim of abuse. This provides a link that otherwise might be absent-the child's
symptoms could be indicative of other problems or nothing at all, or the child could have
fantasized the incident. See, e.g., Middleton, 294 Or. at 435-37, 657 P.2d at 1219-20. This
theory overlooks the possibility that the expert is relying on his or her assessment of the
child's credibility as part of the validation process. Thus this process "bootstraps" the
expert's assessment into substantive evidence presented to the jury.
149. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 (Minn. 1984); Middleton, 294
Or. at 435-37, 657 P.2d at 1219-20.
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tary has the effect of bolstering the child's credibility, but because it is only an indirect result, they are willing to accept it. 150
Other courts have rejected this testimony altogether and have
adhered to the traditional rule that expert opinion on the credibility of a witness is not allowed. 151 These courts point out that
credibility is the crucial question in many child sexual abuse
cases and that the danger of unfair prejudice from the expert
opinion outweighs its probative value. 152 They appear satisfied
that the jury will have the ability to sort out and resolve questions of credibility without hearing the expert's conclusions that
the child is believable.
b. Assessment- Although the foregoing summarizes the
courtroom treatment of expert testimony in cases of child sexual
abuse, it by no means captures the depth and breadth of the
influence of experts in such cases. Not only is their testimony
presented to juries, but appellate courts have made liberal use of
expert research on child sexual abuse in writing judicial opinions
on the subject. 153 Thus, expert opinions have been used to determine the admissibility of children's hearsay statements, 154 other
acts of misconduct by the defendant, 155 and expert testimony
itself. 156
Despite the widespread impact of expert research and testimony on child sexual abuse, the method of presentation of the
150. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609; Middleton, 294 Or. at 435-36, 657
P.2d at 1219-20.
151. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45,
49-50 (1985); Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191 (1980),
aff'd, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981); State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535
(1983); see also Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the
Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 431, 452-57 (1980)
(discussing whether testimony by mental health professionals with respect to credibility
should be limited by the scope of knowledge and experience).
152. FED. R. Evm. 403; see, e.g., State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985); State v.
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985) (holding that an expert witness
generally may give an opinion on the ultimate issue, but not on the credibility of the
victim; the opinion that the children were molested was, in essence, an opinion on their
credibility because the physical evidence was inconclusive; it was improper for the expert
to base an opinion on the ultimate issue solely on her determination of the witness's
veracity).
153. See, e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 21, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985); State v.
Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436 n.9, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 n.9 (1983). Courts may utilize the
primary literature as well as case law and law review articles when issuing judicial opinions on child sexual abuse.
154. See, e.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 163-64 (S.D. 1984); State v.
Gitchel, 41 Wash. App. 820, 826-28, 706 P.2d 1091, 1095-96 (1985).
155. See, e.g., Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (using
expert's testimony in sex crimes involving children to corroborate the child's testimony
and to negate inferences of fantasy, unreliability, or vindictiveness).
156. See supra notes 129-41.

522

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:2

evidence may result in a superficial or sanitized version of abuse
being presented to the fact finder. Normally, the gaps in data or
theory on child sexual abuse that the experts themselves acknowledge are ignored in the courtroom. m In addition, although
the testimony focuses on the dynamics of child sexual abuse, the
expert's opinion on how to respond to the abuse is not sought. 1118
Although this is not unusual when mental health professionals
testify in court, it does illustrate that the legal system seems to
want only a part of the total picture the expert might offer. Finally, the intervenor's theoretical perspective and its influence
on his or her description of child sexual abuse to the fact finder
are rarely discussed. 1119
Although there is no legal requirement that testimony of an
expert include a thorough discussion of all theoretical issues in
the field-and, ordinarily, theory discussion is limited 160-child
sexual abuse cases pose a unique problem. Coupled with the
mechanics of the presentation of the evidence, the omission of
theory discussion from the expert's testimony creates the erroneous impression that sexual abuse has a single and all-encompassing interpretation. The "mechanics" are more easily understood when contrasted to the previously used method of
submitting such testimony in child sexual abuse cases. 161
157. See, e.g., D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 221.
158. If the expert proffers an opinion on how to respond to abuse, it may be ignored.
See, e.g., S.B. v. State, 706 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). Ordinarily, the expert's
opinion is developed as part of the overall assessment of the facts of the case and how
best to deal with the problem. See D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 4, 201 (indicating that
some intervenors emphasize family treatment programs that include reconciliation with
the offender, while others emphasize criminal justice sanctions).
159. The theoretical orientation of the intervenor may result in differing approaches
to child sexual abuse cases. The most common orientations view child sexual abuse as
either rape or as a symptom of family dysfunction. See D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 4.
160. The purpose of theory discussion is to assist the jury in determining how much
weight to give the expert's practical conclusions.
161. An additional adjunct to the role of psychiatrists, see infra notes 162-64 and
accompanying text, was the performance of a psychiatric evaluation of the victim of the
alleged crime. This was in keeping with Wigmore's exhortation that females who claimed
they had been raped or abused should not be believed and should be examined by a
psychiatrist to determine whether they were telling the truth or merely fantasizing. 3A J.
WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 924(a), at 736-37. But see Comment, Psychiatric Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims: A Reevaluation, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1982) (assessing a California statute eliminating the use of court-ordered psychiatric evaluations
of victims of sex crimes; concluding that the statute strikes the proper balance between
victims' rights and defendants' rights).
In some respects, the role of the expert in child sexual abuse cases is similar to that
urged by Wigmore-that is, the expert is called upon to testify that the victim is being
truthful or that the acts described are consistent with the dynamics of sexual abuse. See
Roe, supra note 65, at 108-11.
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Prior to the recent increase in the use of expert testimony,
mental health professionals, particularly psychiatrists, were the
experts of choice in child sexual abuse cases. 162 In keeping with
their role in most criminal prosecutions, the mental health professionals usually assessed the defendant's mental state at the
time of the criminal· behavior to see if he or she was responsible
for it, 163 the mental state at the time of examination to see if he
or she was competent to stand trial, and perhaps the person's
potential for future dangerousness. 164 Controversy surrounded
One major difference in the performance of this role by the expert appears to be an
ideological one. As Finkelhor has noted, the Freudian influence on psychiatrists was one
of the major impediments to the recognition of child sexual abuse as reality. With the
increase in mental health intervenors who reject Freud's premises about sexual abuse,
experts may be less skeptical and become more of an ally than an adversary to the child.
See D. F1NKELHOR, supra note 3, at 11; infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
162. An in-depth discussion of the role of psychiatry in defining and responding to
the problem of child sexual abuse appears in Weisberg, The "Discovery" of Sexual
Abuse: Experts' Role in Legal Policy Formulation, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1984); see
also Oliver, The Mentally Disordered Sex Offender: Facts and Fictions, 3 AM. J. FOREN·
SIC PSYCHIATRY 87 (1982-1983).
163. Dr. Alan Stone has offered an insightful analysis and critique of the psychiatrist's performance of these functions in A STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW (1976). In
brief, the legal system required the psychiatrist to examine the defendant's functioning
in the past, present, and future. The demand to look backward to explain the defendant's state of mind and to look forward to make predictions about future conduct were
responsibilities that many psychiatrists shouldered. Others, claiming that the expertise
of a psychiatrist lay in explaining present and immediate past behavior, not behavior in
the distant past or future, argued that the legal system was requiring what could not be
accomplished.
Dr. Stone and other authors also have pointed out that asking psychiatrists to make
decisions about the defendant's responsibility for a crime is, in reality, a moral judgment
that society should not delegate to them because their expertise in the mental health
area does not necessarily aid them in making those kinds of judgments. Cf. id. at 218-30
(discussing this theory in the context of the insanity defense); D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 3-11 (1980). See generally w. BROMBERG, THE USES OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW
(1979); J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed. 1981).
Congress apparently has adopted that viewpoint in enacting the most recent amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 704, which reads:
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone.
The rule change eliminates the need for the psychiatrist to make the "leap" from answering a medical question to answering a question concerning free will and responsibility under the law. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 1J 704(03); see also Appelbaum, The Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1984);
Bazelon, The Role of the Psychiatrist in the Criminal Justice System, 6 BULL. AM. AcAD.
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 139 (1978).
164. Courts have recognized the fragile ground on which predictions of future conduct rest, but apparently see no way to avoid requiring such predictions. E.g., Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278-79 (1984); Estelle
v. Smith 451 U.S. 454, 472-73 (1981). Congress incorporated the requirement of a predic-
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the psychiatrists who tried to perform these functions for the
system. Frequently, in attempting to comply with the system's
demands, psychiatrists found themselves in disputes with their
colleagues as "battles of the experts" developed over these issues. 1611 The battles took the form of testimony from equally
qualified psychiatrists who would present disparate and irreconcilable points of view on the questions posed in the case. Resolution of the contradictions was left to the fact finder. 166
In child sexual abuse trials, the battle of the experts rarely
occurs. In the typical case, the prosecutor will introduce expert
testimony to describe the phenomenon of child sexual abuse.
The defense generally does not offer a contradictory version. 167
More importantly, the expert for the prosecution may have discussed the allegation with the child and validated the claim of
abuse. 168 The courts ordinarily deny defense experts access to
the child unless· some special showing of need is made. 169
In conjunction with the elimination of professional dispute in
a case, courts have revised the questions the experts are expected to answer. Courts no longer ask the expert to step into
the defendant's mind to explain his or her conduct at the time
of the crime. Instead, courts want the expert to describe ~eneral
tion of future dangerousness into the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 .U.S.C. § 3142(b)
(Supp. Ill 1985); see also Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal"
Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523 (1980); Levine, The Concept of Dangerousness:
Criticism and Compromise, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 147 (B. Sales ed.
1977).
165. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 11 702(04]; see also FED. R. Evrn.
704(b) advisory committee's note.
166. See Morris, Bozzetti·, Rusk & Read, Whither Thou Goest? An Inquiry Into Jurors' Perceptions of the Consequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1058, 1074-75 (1977).
167. Defendants who have tried to introduce a contradictory version of the phenome_non of child abuse have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350,
353-54 (Utah 1985). In Miller, the defendant attempted to offer the expert testimony of
a clinical psychologist to describe the typical psychological profile of individuals who
sexually abuse children. The testimony was excluded because it was speculative and
would have shifted the jury's attention to whether the defendant fit the pattern, and
away from the issue of whether he committed the crime. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1984).
168. E.g., Colgan v. State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Kim, 64
Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); State v.
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985).
169. E.g., State v. Sullivan, 360 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that a
psychiatric exam to determine the child's competency is within the discretion of the trial
court); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 155-56 (S.D. 1985) (psychiatric examinations of
complaining witnesses in sexual offense cases may be ordered upon a substantial showing
of need; the purpose of such an examination is to detect mental or moral delusions or
tendencies that would distort complainant's imagination and affect credibility); State v.
McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984).
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patterns of abuse so the jury can decide whether the substance
of the child's· account fits those patterns. 170 The focus is completely different in such a case: it is on the child-victim, not the
defendant. The mental health professional is not interviewing
someone to see if he or she has a mental disease or defect as a
prerequisite to deciding whether the person was responsible for
past actions. Instead, the expert is interviewing a presumptively
mentally-healthy person to see whether he or she was the victim
of a crime. This eliminates many of the potential impediments
that exist when a psychiatrist examines the alleged offender in a
criminal case.
Analyzing the differences between the role of psychiatrists and
the role of child sexual abuse professionals in cases, it appears
that the controversial aspects 171 of the medical model have disappeared. Battles of the experts will neither consume court time,
nor confuse the jury. The burden associated with a post hoc determination of the defendant's state of mind has decreased; with
child sexual abuse, the professional merely asks the child about
events and validates the complaint. Thus, when these specific
factors are considered, it is likely that child sexual abuse professionals will escape the criticism experienced by their psychiatric
counterparts.
But in eliminating the controversy, has the legal system lost
more than anticipated? Streamlining the process to dispose of a
second point of view and framing questions the professional
feels capable of answering may be deceptive in their simplicity.
Despite the problems associated with the medical model, it
fits reasonably well within the adversary system in the sense
that there is a testing of experts by both sides in the case.1 72
170. See supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
171. See A. STONE, supra note 163; J. ZISKIN, supra note 163; see also Bonnie &
Slobogin, supra note 151.
172. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Court held that when
a defendant makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is
likely to be a significant factor at trial, the state must provide access to a psychiatrist on
this issue. The psychiatrist conducts an examination of the defendant and "assist[s) in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." Id. at 83. In reaching this decision, the Court commented that meaningful access to justice by the defendant is required to ensure the proper functioning of the adversary process. Id. at 77. In the context of a case where the state has made the defendant's mental condition at the time of
the offense relevant, the assistance of a psychiatrist "may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense." Id. at 80. The Court pointed out that psychiatrists
may disagree about a diagnosis of mental illness because psychiatry is· not an exact science. But the adversary system anticipates that:
By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior,
and other information, interpreting it in light of [the psychiatrists'] expertise,
and then laying out their investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psy-
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Even if this probing establishes that there is neither a single version nor a simple answer, it is clear that both parties to a dispute have the opportunity to press their arguments to achieve
their desired result. This benefit of traditional psychiatric testimony is lacking in most adjudications of child sexual abuse.
Even though the inquiry has shifted from the state of mind of
the defendant to the account given by the child, the issue of the
child's credibility still remains important. 173 Child sexual abuse
cases now incorporate a presumption of truth on the part of the
child. 174 Although that presumption may be appropriate in certain cases, such a system overlooks the need for courts not
merely to have the expert employ a presumption, but make a
judgment about credibility as well. Courts want the child sexual
abuse professional to defer a decision about credibility until the
case is evaluated and to make that judgment based on the facts
in the specific case, not on cases· in general. 1711 Ignoring that demand allows the professional to reach early, uninformed conclusions and to perpetuate them during the remaining process of
resolving the case.
Allowing experts to be tested in court and disallowing the presumption that the child is telling the truth will promote syschiatrists for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination
of the truth on the issue before them.
Id. at 81.
173. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also supra note 5.
175. The intervenors' use of the presumptions discussed in the professional literature
is illustrative. For example, in State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986), the government called as witnesses the principal of the alleged victim's elementary school and a
child abuse investigator. Both testified that children generally tell the truth when they
report that they have been sexually abused. The first witness stated that she learned of
statistics on this issue at training sessions and that, in particular, the statistics from one
county indicated that of 75 cases prosecuted, only one involved a child who was not
telling the truth. Id. at 92. The second witness stated that in her 16 years of working
with abused children only one had lied to her about sexual abuse. She added that statistics from the Giaretto Program in San Jose, California revealed that only about one in
2500 children did not tell the truth. Id. The use of statistics to prove guilt has been
criticized in other contexts. See supra note 129.
More importantly, the use of the presumption that the child is not lying can create
problems when we ask the intervenor to evaluate the case at hand. Employing a presumption eliminates the need even to consider alternative explanations, though ultimately they might be rejected. It fosters conclusions based on what is familiar without
close scrutiny of the facts at hand. See supra text accompanying note 38.
See also State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984), Record of Remand Hearing
107-09, where the trial judge quizzecl' the defense psychiatrist about whether he believed
the state supreme court pronouncement that children rarely lie about sexual abuse. The
psychiatrist responded that although as a general proposition that might be true, the
facts and circumstances of each incident have to be examined to see if the generalization
is true in that case.
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temic integrity as well as avoid a vulnerability of child sexual
abuse professionals. This vulnerability manifests itself when the
intervenor performs not only the roles of expert and investigator, but also those of advocate and supporter of the child. The
interdependence of these roles, and the lack of an adversarial
process, create the potential for overreaching without meaningful checks in the process. The import of this is more clearly apparent when considering the extent of the professional's advocacy role.
4. Advocate/therapist- The relationship between the intervenor and the child-victim takes a variety of forms. As seen in
the case law, the professionals most often involved in child sexual abuse cases are (1) those who are given a statutory duty to
investigate child maltreatment178 and (2) those who are in a
therapist-patient relationship with the child. 177 The professional-child relationships of the two groups differ significantly in
theory, but, in practice, they can merge in ways that are important to the criminal justice system and its handling of these
cases. In effect, the nontherapist intervenor inay assume the role
of advocate, which in turn becomes the functional equivalent of
the professional therapist's role.
a. Advocate- The intervenor may assume the role of advocate for the child, even where neither statute nor professional
position imposes that duty. Pressures from society and from
other child sexual abuse professionals may require this of the
intervenor. 178
In its narrow sense, the advocacy role exists as an extension of
the intervenor's participation in child sexual abuse cases. 179 The
176. See supra note 75.
177. E.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State v.
Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983).
178. Professional literature advising intervenors how to validate cases cautions them
not to adopt the role of advocate or to jump to conclusions. J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at
10; Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40. Yet the literature in general fosters that
approach. See Conte & Berliner, Sexual Abuse of Children: Implications for Practice, 62
Soc. CASEWORK 601, 604-06 (1981); see also J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 10-11.
Many authors have recognized the difficulty in divorcing oneself from personal ideologies when called upon to evaluate a situation objectively, see Bonnie & Slobogin, supra
note 151, at 512-14, and have recommended procedures to minimize that influence. See
infra notes 231-42 and accompanying text for suggested ways of enhancing expert objectivity. See also J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 3 (stating that pressures on the social
worker, rescue fantasies, and the emotion-laden character of child sexual abuse can trigger various emotional reactions by intervenors).
179. This is in contrast to the advocacy role in its broad sense, that also may affect
an intervenor's approach to child sexual abuse cases. For exaniple, social workers, who
serve as intervenors in many child sexual abuse cases, have a tradition of both advocacy
for an individual client and advocacy for a class of people who are "social victims." In
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intervenor participates in every stage of the victim's treatment
and preparation for trial. It is the intervenor who listens to the
victim's account of sexual abuse, offers personal support, and
provides needed services. 180 The professional also acts as the victim's advocate by consulting with prosecutors on how to resolve
the case and by assisting the victim with confusing legal procedures.181 At trial, the intervenor will testify as an expert182 and
will provide the child's account to the fact finder 183 to achieve
vindication for the individual child.
The performance of the advocacy function has appeal partly
because it reverses the past tendency to "revictimize"18' the
child while resolving his or her case. It indicates to the child that
responsible adults believe the claim of abuse and are willing to
help. 1811 The intervenor's service as an advocate, however, is
troubling. When the investigative process begins, the system
asks the intervenor to question the child in order to validate the
claim. At the same time, the system asks the intervenor to ensure that the interview has a therapeutic effect on the child and
that the child understands that the interviewer believes and
one role, the social worker supports, advises, and, if need be, represents the individual
client in dealing with the social organizations that affect his or her life. In the other role,
the social worker focuses on systemic reforms to alleviate the victimization of the particular class of people. In many cases, the two advocacy roles will overlap.
This model of the advocacy function appears to have been adopted by child sexual
abuse intervenors, regardless of whether they are social workers. The social advocacy role
is one that many child sexual abuse professionals have embraced in an effort to change
the system's handling of these cases. The professionals have been among the most influential groups seeking legislative reform in the criminal justice system to accommodate
child abuse cases. They have drawn the attention of the public to the scope and dynamics of the problem and have worked to eliminate the myths about it. They have endeavored to develop creative ways of rehabilitating offenders and strengthening their families,
or in the alternative, to ensure punishment for offenders where appropriate. E.g., D.
FINKELHOR, supra note 2.
The philosophy of advocacy has been incorporated into the National Association of
Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics. Section F of the Code states that the social
worker's primary responsibility is to clients, and § Fl declares that "[t]he social worker
should serve clients with devotion, loyalty, determination, and the maximum application
of professional skill and competence." Section P encourages the social worker to promote
the general welfare of society, including, in accordance with § PG, advocating "changes in
policy and legislation to improve social conditions and to promote social justice." NASW
CODE OF ETHICS (July 1, 1980). See also Ad Hoc Comm. on Advocacy, The Social Worker
as Advocate: Champion of Social Victims, Soc. WORK, Apr. 1969, at 16; Paul, A Framework for Understanding Advocacy, in CHILD ADVOCACY WITHIN THE SYSTEM 11 (J. Paul,
G. Neufeld & J. Pelosi eds. 1977).
180. See Sgroi, supra note 83, at 97-108.
181. J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 16-17.
182. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
184. J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 10.
185. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 60.
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supports him or her. 188 Although it is not usually acJmowledged,
there may be difficulty in maintaining a friendly, therapeutic,
and supportive relationship with the child while engaging in an
investigative process that necessitates asking diffic~lt questions
to test the reliability of the child's account. 187 If probing these
issues will disrupt the supportive nature of the encounter, the
advocate-intervenor may be less willing to press the child for answers. Likewise, the advocate's inability to hear anything but a
consistent or believable statement from the child 188 may influence the intervenor's function of chronicling the child's account.189 Finally, when the interviewer testifies as an expert at
trial or advises criminal justice personnel about the proposed
disposition of the case, the advocacy function may shape his or
her statements to make them consistent with the information
gleaned from the child. 190
Though elusive, one goal of the investigative process is to ensure that, on some level, it is conducted by someone neutral.
Likewise, experts and hearsay witnesses preferably should have
no personal stake in the outcome of the criminal proceeding that
could bias their work. 181 Once advocacy exists as an extension of
186. Id. at 48, 60.
187. J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 2-4 (a protective service worker may feel ambivalent about the "conflicting roles of helper and investigator"); cf. Weil, Research on Issues
in Collaboration Between Social Workers and Lawyers, 56 Soc. SERV. REV. 393 (1982)
(discussing the conflicting roles of a· social worker when corroborating with attorneys).
188. See generally C. LEVY, Soc1AL WORK ETHICS (1976). Levy notes that the social
worker has considerable power in dealing with the client. Use of such power to serve the
client's interest may !ead him or her to proceed "with a self-righteous lack of restraint"
and may be an abuse of power. Id. at 77. He cautions social workers to address their
attitudes-favorable or not-toward clients so they can serve them properly. Id. at 12327. Excessive identification with the clients may be a hindrance and may have detrimental effects on third parties who are in a position_ to be adversely affected by the social
worker's judgments. Id. at 136, 150; see also Krell & Okin, Countertransference Issues in
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 5 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 5 (1984).
189. See supra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
190. This problem may occur because of the requirement that the professional "validate" the complaint, at least in part, based on his or her familiarity with the dynamics of
sexual abuse. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40, 70. In addition, the behavioral
indicators of abuse vary and may be contradictory, so the intervenor has to employ his or
her professional judgment to reach a conclusion that abuse did or did not occur. Id. at
40-41. Validation is not a "neat" process-experts recognize the difficulty of piecing together the child's account. See supra text accompanying notes 129-41. Many cases cannot be resolved conclusively. Sgroi, Child Sexual Assault: Some Guidelines for Interven·
tion and Assessment, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, supra note 2,
at 140.
191. The preference for an unbiased expert clearly is just a preference, not a prerequisite to the expert's testifying. E.g., Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171, 1174
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a witness who is employed by a party is not precluded from
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the investigative/expert/chronicler functions, the possibility of
neutrality diminishes considerably.
Admittedly, in many circumstances, neither investigators nor
experts are neutral. 192 The inconsistent functions that the system asks the professionals in child sexual abuse cases to perform, however, go far beyond an occasional overlapping of roles.
In its endeavor to address the problem of abuse, the system has
determined that these professionals can perform many roles.
Professionals have taken on these responsibilities without full
consideration of whether the roles might conflict or whether the
method of performing one role might undercut the proper performance of another. 193
The multiplicity of functions performed by child sexual abuse
professionals is by no means part of a sinister endeavor to disrupt the criminal justice process. They are doing exactly what
the system asks them to do. The burden lies not only on these
professionals, but also on others in the legal system to examine
the implications of performing potentially conflicting tasks to
see what problems are created and what solutions are available.
b. Therapist- In theory, the duties of the therapist differ
markedly from those of other intervenors in child sexual abuse
cases. The therapist's duty is to help the child, regardless of the
validity of the complaint of sexual abuse. 10" The therapist addresses the myriad consequences of abuse experienced by the
child-victim through individual therapy, group therapy, or other
appropriate treatment. 1 0&
testifying as an expert). See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29,
11 702[04].
192. E.g., Gorman, Are There Impartial Psychiatric Witnesses?, 11 BULL. AM. AcAD.
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 379 (1983).
193. One indicator of the ability of intervenors to adequately perform the tasks assigned them is the number of successful lawsuits that have challenged their handling of
sexual abuse cases. Comparatively few such suits have been brought. See D. BEsHAROV,
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY IN CHILD WELFARE WORK: THE GROWING TREND 15 (1983)
(citing Martin v. Weld, 598 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1979), and Hale v. City of Virginia Beach,
Fed. Dist. Ct., Eastern Dist. of Va., Norfolk Div., Civ. S0-151-N); see also Silas, Would a
Kid Lie?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 17 (reporting on multimillion-dollar civil suits filed
against prosecutor, county officials, and therapists involved in child sexual abuse cases in
Jordan, Minn.). Loss of insurance coverage is another potential problem with the delivery of services in these cases.
194. See People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1097, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985);
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 244, 681 P.2d 291, 296, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 (1984).
195. See Porter, Blick & Sgroi, supra note 79, at 109: See generally Rosenberg, The
Psychologist in Court Proceedings Involving Children, in ADVOCATING FOR CHILDREN IN
THE COURTS 264-93 (National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & Protection
ed. 1979).
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In practice, the legal system may call upon the therapist to
perform other functions as well. Because the diagnosis of the
complainant is an initial step in preparing a treatment plan,
prosecutors have sought to use the therapist's conclusions about
abuse as substantive proof of its existence. 196 Likewise, they
have endeavored to use the therapist as an expert in the case. 197
In this respect, the therapist performs roles similar to those of
other, nontherapist intervenors.
Because in theory the therapist's role is to "help" the child, at
least one court has taken steps to limit the roles the therapist
may perform at trial. 198 The limitation precludes the therapist
from presenting fact-based conclusions to the fact finder. Thus,
if the therapist determined the facts of the case with virtually
the same information that will be presented to the fact finder,
his or her conclusions about those facts will not be admitted. 199
The therapist may discuss child sexual abuse in general, but
may not introduce his or her diagnosis about the particular case
as a matter of substantive evidence. 200
C. Impact of the Intervenor's Approach
The courts in Roscoe and Logue sensed some of the potential
problems with the role of the professional in child sexual abuse
cases. 201 The Roscoe court responded to these concerns by
prohibiting the intervenor from giving an opinion on whether
the child had been molested if that intervenor had (1) developed
a therapeutic relationship with the child that created a duty to
help him or her and (2) based the opinion on information derived from the therapeutic relationship. 202 The Logue court disallowed similar testimony not because of the existence of a therapeutic relationship but rather because the opinion, given in the
196. See Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50; Colgan v.
State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
197. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1098, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
198. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State v. Logue,
372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985); see supra notes 55-60, 62, 65-69 and accompanying
text.
202. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1098-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50; see supra notes
55-60, 62 and accompanying text.
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language of expert testimony and not supported by scientific
data, was unfairly prejudicial. 203
One problem presented by these cases is that a type of therapeutic relationship-one in which the intervenor sees himself or
herself with a duty to help the victim-exists in virtually all
child sexual abuse cases where the intervenor personally assists
the child. The "therapeutic" aspect of the role may be more akin
to advocacy, 20• and although it may not exist by virtue of a statutory duty, it permeates the case nevertheless. Although the
courts have focused on the presence of a formal, therapeutic relationship, the multiplicity of roles played by an expert in the
case may be equally problematic as the courts endeavor to sort
out potential conflicts of interest and misuses of experts. Thus,
in Logue, where the social worker investigated the complaint,
obtained the hearsay account, testified as an expert based primarily on her decision that the child's statement was believable,
and served in a supporting role for the child, 20 ~ the court should
have examined the manner in which she participated in the case
as an additional basis for assessing the probative value of her
testimony.
Problems emerge, however, when some of the goals of the adversary system 206 are evaluated in light of the actual handling of
child sexual abuse cases. The idea of an intervenor serving as a
therapist/advocate and also as an expert witness on behalf of the
client seems peculiar in a system that expects neutral witnesses
to submit to testing and probing. In a similar vein, when the
expert is also the investigator, chronicler, and advocate for the
child, confidence in impartiality and scrutiny of the evidence
diminishes. 207
When searching for ways to diffuse authority and responsibility for the resolution of child sexual abuse cases, it is useful to
examine some of the mechanisms already in place in the system.
The use of a court-appointed expert208 to implement a "team
203. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157; see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
205. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 154, 156, 159; State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 {S.D.
1984), Record of Remand at 246-48 {Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter Record of Remand]
{copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.)
206. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
207. Id.
208. The defendant has the option of employing his own expert to perform the functions described herein. If the defendant elects to do so, the defense expert would function in the same manner as any other party's expert.
The rationale for seeking a court-appointed expert is that the performance of multiple
or poorly-defined roles may result in the intervenor reaching unreliable conclusions that
will be perpetuated throughout the case. This undermines the proper working of the
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approach" 209 to child sexual abuse cases has the most potential
for relieving the problem of multiple or ill-defined functions and
enhancing the benefits of the adversary process.

Ill.

PROPOSAL

When the government seeks to introduce the testimony of an
expert or intervenor in a child sexual abuse case, 210 upon motion
of the defense, the court should determine whether the individual has the same relationship with the child as did the psychologist in People v. Roscoe, 211 or its functional equivalent. The
court should inquire (1) whether the proposed witness has a
therapist-patient relationship with the child or (2) whether the
individual has assumed the equivalent of that relationship indirectly as an extension of the advocacy function.
Upon finding a therapist-patient relationship, 212 the court has
several options. The court could prohibit the expert from testifying about his or her diagnosis of the child-as it did in Roscoe-but allow the expert to testify about child sexual abuse
based on the professional literature and experience. Alternatively, if the intervenor assumes the role of the child's advocate,
which precipitates an informal, therapist-patient relationship, or
if the intervenor performs multiple functions that could undermine the reliability of any one of those functions, there are two
options. First, the court could follow the lead of Roscoe, allowing
testimony about child sexual abuse in general, if the intervenor
is qualified to give such information, and preventing any testimony on the intervenor's conclusions about the specific child or
adversary process, so the response of the system should not be couched in adversary
terms. That is, if the process itself has been impeded, responding in an adversary manner may not be an effective means of exposing the unreliability that the system has
fostered.
209. See J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 18; THE CHILD PROTECTION
TEAM HANDBOOK (B. Schmitt ed. 1978); J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 4; Boerma, supra
note 81, at 34; Cramer, The District Attorney as a Mobilizer in a Community Approach
to Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 209, 211 (1985); see also Sgroi, Multidisciplinary Team Review of Child-Sexual-Abuse Cases, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
335; infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
210. As a practical matter, expert testimony as rebuttal evidence is given wider deference by the courts. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State
v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). If, however, the proposed expert or
intervenor has performed multiple or poorly-defined functions in the case and, thus, has
created the potential for misuse of the testimony, the approach discussed herein should
be employed to try to limit or exclude the evidence.
211. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
212. See infra text accompanying note 247.
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the factors supporting his or her c.onclusions because they are
the functional equivalent of a therapist's diagnosis. Second, the
court could appoint an independent expert to ascertain whether
the intervenor's conflicting roles tainted any conclusions reached
during the investigation of the case.
A.

Therapist-Patient Relationship

The Roscoe court expressed discomfort with the use of a therapist's diagnosis of a patient as substantive evidence offered to
prove the allegations against the defendant. The court feared
the misuse of psychological testimony through the introduction
of conclusions reached by the therapist during a process not
designed to determine the truth or accuracy of the particular
past event. The court also feared the introduction of the patient's account of events derived during that process and used to
support the therapist's conclusions. 213 Thus, according to Roscoe, evidence obtained in a noncritical therapeutic setting214 may
not be introduced as proof that the events took place. .
In deciding whether particular evidence fits within the rubric
established in Roscoe, one must look at the nature of the evidence and the context in which it was derived. Analogies to rape
trauma syndrome 2111 and battered child syndrome216 evidence are
instructive. Rape trauma syndrome evidence is a description of
an individual's reactions to trauma. 217 As a general proposition,
the conclusion that an individual is experiencing rape trauma
213. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
214. The encounter in Roscoe can be characterized as "noncritical" therapy because
the purpose was not to challenge the child's account, but to provide support and assistance to him. In People v. Payan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct. App. 1985), the court noted the
distinction, apparently assuming a "critical" therapeutic interview with an intervenor
would yield information that would be more reliable in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 133.
Whether the usual interview between intervenor and child falls into the former or latter
class is a question that should be analyzed not just by examining the formal relationship
of the parties (e.g., therapist-patient), but by asking whether in fact the encounter is a
"noncritical" one. The role of the intervenor as advocate may preclude the existence of a
"critical" therapeutic relationship.
215. See Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1097, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (citing People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)); see also supra note 57.
216. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249, 681 P.2d at 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458;
Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181
J. A,M.A. 17 (1962) (advising physicians to look for poor health, poor hygiene, or soft
tissue injury, and for discrepancies in what the parents say happened and the extent of
the injury); see also supra note 1.
217. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 246, 681 P.2d at 297, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57; see supra
note 57.
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syndrome is made by a counselor engaged in provicling support
and therapy to a rape victim. The primary purpose of the counselor-client relationship is to provide services to the client, not
to derive proof that a crime occurred. 218 In contrast, evidence of
battered child syndrome ordinarily is obtained through a physical examination that searches for bone injury, subdural hematomas, and other serious injuries. 219 The principal purpose of the
inquiry is not to provide emotional support for the child, but to
determine whether the child's injuries are intentional or accidental so further intervention can be planned if necessary. Because of the different context in which the information is acquired, the evidence is treated differently; usually, the court
does not admit the rape counselor's conclusion that a rape occurred, but does admit the medical examiner's conclusion that
the child was battered.
Applying the two-part inquiry220 into the nature of the evidence and how it was derived can be useful in determining what
portion of the expert testimony should be admitted in a child
sexual abuse case. In Roscoe, for example, the court concluded
that expert testimony about molestation, at least as rebuttal evidence, that was based on professional literature and experience221 satisfied the first prong of the two-part test. The second
prong of the test was not met, however: derivation of the evidence in the therapist-patient setting blocked admissibility because of the nonchallenging, noncritical character of the encounters and their primary purpose as therapeutic sessions for
the child. 222
Moreover, not only does this two-part assessment resolve the
issue of admissibility where a formal, therapist-patient relationship exists, but by requiring an analysis of the context in which
the expert reached the conclusion and an examination of the expert's relationship with the child, it also has implications for
cases where a formal, therapist-patient relationship does not
exist. 223
Roscoe's two-part test is flawed, however, and People v.
Payan 224 demonstrates the extent of the problem. If the nature
of the evidence meets the first prong-that the evidence about
218. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 250-51, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60.
219. Id. at 249, 681 P.2d at 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459; see supra note 214.
220. See supra text accompanying note 202.
221. People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985).
222. Id., at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 224-29.
224. 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct. App. 1985).
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child sexual abuse is in itself reliable and useful to the fact
finder-then, by implication, if the expert has not reached his or
her conclusions in a therapeutic setting, the conclusion that the
child was molested would be admissible. 2211 Allowing the expert
to offer such conclusions when he or she has not even interviewed the child, however, does not comport with accepted practice among experts dealing with child sexual abuse. 226 In addition, admitting such a conclusion appears to be an unwarranted
deviation from the rule prohibiting expert testimony on the
credibility of a witness. For both reasons, the type of evidence
offered in Payan, which would be admissible under the Roscoe
two-prong test, should be excluded.
B.

The Advocacy Role or Performance of Multiple Functions

Although the role is not part of a statutory or other officially
defined description of duties, the intervenor in a child sexual
abuse case might become the advocate for the child, either intentionally or unintentionally. 227 In an effort to improve upon
investigative techniques used with children, experts in the field
of ·child sexual abuse have recommended an interviewing process
that will have a "therapeutic" effect on the child. 228 While this
recommendation does not mean that the intervenor will literally
engage in therapy with the child, it does convey the overall nature of the relationship as a helping, supportive one. Even
though the primary task of the intervenor might be to investigate and determine the facts, 229 this recommendation considers
the creation of a supportive atmosphere for the child equally important. As a matter of policy, the "therapeutic" approach might
be the preferred route; but once we create that relationship, we
must examine how the intervenor should function for the remainder of the case. The key inquiry should be whether the
"helping" aspect of the relationship has overshadowed the investigative function to the extent that the intervenor has assumed a
role equivalent to that of a "noncritical" therapist.
The question becomes particularly compelling where the intervenor performs several functions. If, as a general proposition,
the intervenor is to investigate the facts, but the advocacy role
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
See supra note 63.
See supra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48.
Id. at 39-40.

WINTER

1987]

Balancing the Child Abuse System

537

has become of paramount importance to him or her, the integrity of the investigative process may be questionable. This is
particularly important when the government seeks to introduce
the testimony of the intervenor as an investigator and expert
witness who will conclude that the child was molested.
At least two methods are available to address this situation.
The first is to analogize to Roscoe and allow the intervenor· to
testify about child sexual abuse in general, but not to permit an
opinion that the complainant was molested or to relate in detail
the underlying facts supporting such an opinion. 230 The rationale for this standard is that the proffered evidence was derived
in a setting in which the intervenor assumed a role equivalent to
a therapist, so it should be treated in a like manner.
The second option should be exercised in those situations
where the intervenor has assumed multiple, overlapping, or
poorly-defined roles that call into question the integrity of the
fact-finding aspect of the investigation itself. 231 In such situations, a more radical alternative is appropriate because of the
weight accorded the intervenor's assessment. 232 Such an alternative is the use of a court-appointed expert.
The case law and the Federal Rules of Evidence both recognize the power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his or her
selection. 233 The most frequently cited reason for giving the
judge this power is to eliminate the battle of experts, in the hope
that a neutral appointee will enhance the fact finder's ability to
determine the truth in the case. 234
This option has considerable potential for child sexual abuse
cases but for different reasons than anticipated by the drafters
of Federal Rule of Evidence 706. If we recognize that some of
the benefits of the adversary system have been sacrificed in the
230. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985); see supra
notes 55-60, 209-19 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 123.
232. E.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45; State v. Logue,
372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985). The expert evidence is introduced to assist the jury in
resolving the disputed issues of fact in the case. Presumably, the jury will give a fair
amount of weight to the expert's testimony even if an instruction is given advising the
jury that it may accept or reject the expert opinion in reaching its conclusions.
233. FED. R. Evm. 706; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 17. Procedurally,
the appointment may be by the court's own motion or at the request of either party. An
expert appointed by the court must be informed of his or her duties in writing or at a
conference in which both parties may participate. At trial, the expert may be called by
the court or by either party.
234. FED. R. Evm. 706 advisory committee's note; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 29, ll 706(01].
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effort to mitigate harshness in child sexual abuse cases,m a
means of recapturing some of those benefits is appealing. The
most noteworthy benefit of the adversary system that is lost is
the injection of a second point of view into a case. This benefit
was lost when the system delegated multiple functions to a single individual or relied on the child's advocate for expert testimony. The court-appointed expert should conduct a critical
evaluation of the investigation and of the conclusions reached
whenever an expert's roles overlap. In particular, the evaluation
should determine whether an important and relevant viewpoint
was omitted, whether the procedures served the truth-seeking
function, and whether the performance of multiple functions has
undermined the conclusions in the case. 236 Additional inquiries
based on the specific fact pattern could be requested. 237 If the
court appointee determines that there are important flaws in the
235. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984). In that case, the
state supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
child's statements to two intervenors demonstrated circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to qualify for admissibility under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5). The defendant called as an expert witness a psychiatrist
who critiqued the circumstances under which one of the intervenors obtained the statements from the child. The psychiatrist pointed out that if an intervenor has had a prior
therapeutic relationship with the child, as had one intervenor, then this relationship
should have caused the intervenor to disqualify herself. His reasons were that serving as
an intervenor might disrupt any future therapeutic relationship with the child, and,
more importantly, that the relationship might create a bias in conducting an objective
evaluation. Record of Remand, supra note 205, at 102. The psychiatrist pointed out that
the client, fearful of rejection and losing a relationship with the intervenor, might tell the
intervenor things to please him or her. He concluded that the problems caused by the
manner of conducting the evaluation raised a serious question about its validity, and, in
fact, that the results of the interview were invalid and unreliable. Id. at 105-07.
The trial judge responded to the psychiatrist's testimony by citing the South Dakota
Supreme Court opinion that remanded the case, State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W. 2d 159,
164 (S.D: 1984), in which the court commented that a child is unlikely to fabricate a
graphic act of sexual activity because it is beyond the realm of his or her experience. The
psychiatrist stated his general agreement with that view, but pointed out that the inquiry should be whether the particular child has had such an experience, not whether
children in general do. Record of Remand, supra note 205, at 107-09.
Interestingly, the defense also produced evidence from a friend of the child's mother
that the child had observed him engaging in sexual intercourse with the mother. Record
of Remand, supra note 205, at 95. Neither the original intervenor nor the trial judge
seemed to have found that information determinative.
The trial court found that the child's statements demonstrated circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and, based on that determination, affirmed the defendant's conviction. McCatferty, 356 N.W.2d at 167.
237. In McCafferty, the intervenor had a prior therapeutic relationship with the
child. 356 N.W.2d at 161. An inquiry to determine the effect that might have on the
investigation and validation process would be appropriate.
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case based on these criteria, the court should grant the defense
motion to restrict the role of the intervenor in the case. 238
Why is the inclusion of another layer of expertise warranted in
child sexual abuse cases? Modifications to the adversary system
in such cases have been made to eliminate the trial of the childvictim. Revamped hearsay rules, a more humane investigative
process, and the assistance of experts and advocates have accomplished this goal in many respects. The defense of child sexual abuse cases formerly focused on the victim and his or her
capacity to endure cross-examination at trial-if the case even
progressed that far. The system now in many respects has substituted adults, such as parents and child sexual abuse_ professionals, for the child. The defendant's focus also must shift; now
he or she must be prepared to respond to the child's claims as
expressed not only by the child, but also by the adults in the
case. Because any experts that the defendant wishes to engage
will not have access to the child, 239 and because the validation
process normally takes place long before trial without the defendant's participation, 2 • 0 there is virtually no opportunity to
challenge either the investigative process or the conclusions except at trial. By the time of trial, however, the child sexual
abuse professional will be expected to serve as a government
witness in the adversary process, and the defendant will have ,
little or no basis on which to challenge the witness's conclusions.
Inserting a check through the use of a court-appointed expert
ensures the integrity of the process to a greater extent than
presently exists. 2 • 1 This additional factor, coupled with more humane treatment of the child, creates a more equitable balancing
of the interests of the disputants and of society.
In essence, this is a formal, court-sponsored implementation
of the team review process 2 • 2 that has been recommended for
238. See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 207.
241. In those jurisdictions where court appointees are used to review cases, an added
benefit would be the avoidance of conflicting and poorly-defined roles by intervenors at
the outset. Preempting undesired conduct by experts is touted as one favorable sideeffect of the rule permitting court appointments. See FEo. R. Evm. 706 advisory committee's note.
242. Implementation of a team approach to case management has been suggested in
similar contexts. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 151, at 514-20. These authors argue
that a structured decisionmaking process is essential so that forensic clinicians may reduce error and promote consistency in their evaluations of defendants in the criminal
justice system. Use of a team of professionals. from various· disciplines, who are instructed to consider as many hypotheses as possible in resolving the questions presented
by the case, is one method of achieving the goal. Bonnie and Slobogin acknowledge this
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child sexual abuse cases by experts in the field. 243 The experts
recognize their own shortcomings in handling such cases and appreciate the potential of multidisciplinary team review to improve the quality of case management and to provide expertise
that otherwise might be absent. This preferred method of case
analysis is one that should be incorporated into the legal system.
What showing should be required to obtain a court-appointed
expert? The defense counsel should examine how the intervenor
has functioned in the case to see if he or she has performed conflicting roles. Of particular concern are activities244 or influences
that might have interfered with the investigative role of the intervenor, because the "validation" process .relies so heavily on
the intervenor's subjective evaluation of the situation. 2411 Examples of problematic influences are preconceived notions about
child sexual abuse and its dynamics, 246 which impede the intervenor's investigation to see whether the case at hand actually
fits the patterns that the intervenor expects to find. When facts
exist to rebut the generalizations about sexual abuse 247 but the
intervenor has dismissed them as nondeterminative, further inquiry is appropriate. In the alternative, if the child's account is
confused and corroborating evidence is not apparent, an independent probing of the intervenor's investigation is warranted to
test the validity of the conclusion that abuse exists.
A related inquiry should be made to determine what the intervenor has done to assist the child personally and to evaluate
what type of relationship the intervenor has developed with the
child. If the intervenor has assumed an advocacy or therapy
function, then outside scrutiny is warranted to see if the results
of the intervenor's work are reliable enough for use in the criminal process. 248
is one way to minimize the· influence of "personal predilections and ideologies upon the
decisionmaking process." Id. at 514.
243. See supra note 209. A less radical alternative to the use of a court-appointed
expert to provide the team review function is to grant defense motions to discover reports prepared by a child sexual abuse team already in place in the jurisdiction, if one
exists.
244. See supra note 179.
245. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
246. For example, children do not lie about sexual abuse or children do not have
sexual knowledge. See supra notes 86-87.
247. E.g., Record of Remand, supra note 205, at 95 (child had observed acts of sexual
intercourse between her mother and a man other than the defendant prior to making a
statement about the defendant's conduct).
248. A conclusion that the results of the investigation are unreliable for a criminal
prosecution does not necessarily preclude their use in an administrative proceeding
where the government's burden of proof would be lower. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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CONCLUSION

Recent modifications to the adversary system to accommodate
child victims reflect a recognition of their needs and the importance of vindicating their rights. The participation of experts on
behalf of children has enhanced the ability of the legal system to
respond to the needs and rights of the child victim. That expertise should be critically evaluated to ensure it is being employed
in child sexual abuse cases in an appropriate manner. In those
situations where the expertise might be misused because of the
performance of a ·therapeutic or advocative role by the intervenor, the court should limit the testimony to exclude an assessment of the validity of the prosecuting witness's claim. Where
the integrity of the investigation is called into question, the
court should exercise the option of using a court-appointed expert. Adding these checks should serve to maintain the influence
of intervenors in child sexual abuse cases without jeopardizing
the benefits of an adversary adjudication of guilt or innocence.

§ 26-8-22.5 (1984) (requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding
that a child is dependent or neglected).

